FTC et al. v. Amazon.com, Inc.

The FTC-State Plaintiffs open on the relevant markets. The online superstore market is not gerrymandered. It is defined by a distinct product. [SAC: "Online superstores compete to build long-term relationships with consumers across multiple purchases of a variety of items."]

Amazon's own conduct confirms the boundary. [SAC: "Amazon does not allow other online superstores like Walmart.com to sell through Amazon."] Amazon courts limited-selection brands as sellers but excludes superstore rivals. That asymmetry reflects which firms Amazon itself treats as competitors.

The marketplace services market rests on the same logic. [SAC: "SaaS providers, unlike online marketplace service providers, do not provide access to an established U.S. customer base."]

Monopoly power is established two independent ways.

• Structurally. [SAC: "Amazon’s share of the overall value of goods sold by online superstores is well above 60%—and rising."] In marketplace services, Amazon holds [SAC: "a market share of greater than 66% of marketplace sales"]. Barriers of scale, network effects and switching costs protect both shares.
• Directly. [SAC: "Amazon now takes nearly one out of every two dollars of sales from sellers who use its fulfillment services"]. [SAC: "Amazon’s ability to profitably worsen its service for customers is a hallmark of monopoly power."]

Amazon called the market gerrymandered. It then acknowledged the issue was a [DKT-289: "factual dispute"] that needed no resolution at the pleading stage.

The Court should find both pleaded markets valid and monopoly power established in each. The question for Amazon is this: what firm, on this record, disciplines its superstore prices or its seller fees?

Amazon.com, Inc. answers directly: on the SAC's own allegations, the excluded firms discipline Amazon's prices. The pleaded market fails on the Plaintiffs' own record.

The exclusion rests on assertion, not on evidence of non-substitution. The SAC concedes that the excluded stores compete on price: [SAC: "Even though such stores may price certain items comparably with online superstores, shoppers do not seriously consider those stores as reasonable alternatives to online superstores for a significant portion of their shopping needs."] A "significant portion" does not draw a market boundary. Comparable pricing is the hallmark of substitutes.

Plaintiffs' own narrative contradicts that line. The SAC calls Zulily only [SAC: "a potential entrant to the online superstore market specializing in homeware, children’s products, and women’s clothing"]. Yet it pleads that Zulily [SAC: "displayed its lower price alongside the higher prices of identical products on Amazon or Walmart.com"] and calls this [SAC: "a classic form of price competition"]. A specialty retailer competing head-to-head with Amazon on price is inside the market. Plaintiffs cannot exclude it for share purposes and include it for conduct purposes.

The shares depend on the denominator. The headline figure counts only the [SAC: "top-4 general merchandise platforms"]. When the set widens even modestly, the share falls to [SAC: "a 60.8% share"]. The SAC then dismisses that broader set as overinclusive. A share that moves every time the boundary is redrawn measures the boundary, not power.

Amazon.com, Inc. concedes monopoly power in no market. The burden remains with Plaintiffs, who [DKT-289: "must prove that Amazon has monopoly power in a properly defined antitrust market"]. This record defines no such market.

The FTC-State Plaintiffs challenge Amazon's denominator argument. The record refutes it.

Amazon claims the share "moves every time the boundary is redrawn." It moves only within a band that is monopoly-level on every measure:

• Across the top-four platforms, Amazon [SAC: "has maintained an estimated market share of more than 69% of GMV since 2015, with that share growing over time."]
• A second industry source reports [SAC: "more than 82% of GMV in 2022."]
• Amazon's own competitor list [SAC: "includes stores that may lack the breadth and/or depth of selection necessary to qualify as online superstores"]. On that list, Amazon still [SAC: "had a 72.5% market share based on U.S. GMV among this set of online stores in 2021."]
• The broadest set, Amazon's own overinclusive Net Promoter list, still yields [SAC: "a 60.8% share"].

Amazon selected that last denominator itself, and it deliberately includes non-superstores. Widening the market to admit the excluded stores does not dissolve the power. The boundary does not produce the result. The power does.

Zulily does not rescue Amazon. It confirms the point. The SAC pleads Zulily as a potential entrant, which is precisely the kind of firm that monopoly maintenance excludes. Amazon's sales were [SAC: "approximately 100 times greater than Zulily"]. When Zulily attempted price competition, [SAC: "Zulily could not sustain its low-price campaign against a giant sitting on monopoly profits."] A fringe firm that is driven out when it tries to constrain prices is evidence of monopoly power, not a substitute that disciplines it.

The question to Amazon remains unanswered. On which of these denominators, including those Amazon itself chose, does Amazon's share fall below monopoly levels?

Amazon.com, Inc. answers: every share Plaintiffs cite counts only online stores, so none can test the market boundary.

All four figures (69%, 82%, 72.5% and 60.8%) were computed after one sentence had already removed physical retail: [SAC: "brick-and-mortar stores and online stores with a more limited selection are not reasonably interchangeable with online superstores for the same purposes and are thus properly excluded from the online superstore market."] Four figures resting on one contested exclusion are a single assumption repeated four times. Consistent shares cannot validate the line that produced them.

• The SAC concedes that physical stores have competing advantages. [SAC: "On the other hand, shoppers can see products in person before buying at brick-and-mortar stores and can typically take purchased items home immediately."] Channels that each offer what the other lacks are differentiated competitors, not separate markets.
• Plaintiffs' own evidence treats physical stores as the benchmark. [SAC: "Amazon internally contrasts the benefits of the depth of selection available in its online superstore with the “clear gaps” in selection at physical stores."] A firm does not measure itself against retailers outside its market.
• The operational evidence concerns supply, not demand. [SAC: "Because different expertise is required to manage an online store, companies that operate both typically run them through separate divisions."] Internal organization reveals nothing about where shoppers turn when prices rise.

The record is silent on how shoppers respond when online prices rise relative to physical-store prices. Without that evidence, Plaintiffs describe product features, not market boundaries. Amazon.com, Inc. concedes monopoly power in no market.

[PHASE CHECK] Turn 4 raised a new argument with fresh SAC citations: all cited shares depend on excluding brick-and-mortar retail, and the record lacks demand-side substitution evidence. Plaintiffs have not answered it. Amazon has not engaged the marketplace-services market or the direct-evidence theory.

The FTC-State Plaintiffs challenge Amazon's claim that the record is silent on how shoppers respond to price increases. The record shows that response, and it does not depend on any denominator.

The direct evidence tests the boundary Amazon disputes. If physical stores disciplined Amazon, profitable price increases and quality degradation would fail. They did not:

• Price increases held. [SAC: "Project Nessie generated enormous profits for Amazon even though its higher prices caused Amazon’s unit sales to decrease."] This answers the market-definition question in practice. Amazon raised prices, lost some sales, and still profited. Brick-and-mortar retail was available to every one of those shoppers, yet it did not constrain Amazon.
• Quality degradation held. [SAC: "Despite degrading shoppers’ experiences, Amazon continues to have double digit growth in overall sales, not losing meaningful numbers of shoppers to rivals."] Physical stores were open to those shoppers. None drew enough of them away to change Amazon's conduct.
• The governing principle. [SAC: "Amazon’s ability to profitably do the following without losing sufficient business to change its behavior illustrates its monopoly power"].

Amazon's physical-store argument does not reach the second market at all. Sellers cannot buy access to online shoppers from a physical store's shelf. On this record, [SAC: "Amazon has also hiked average fulfillment fees to sellers, which jumped approximately 30% between 2020 and 2022."] Amazon points to nothing that disciplined those fees.

Differentiated channels do not merge into one market. The test is whether the excluded channel constrains price, and here it did not. The Court should find both pleaded markets valid and monopoly power proven in each.

Amazon.com, Inc. challenges the Plaintiffs' reading of Project Nessie. On the SAC's own terms, Nessie shows constraint by rivals, not freedom from it.

A firm with monopoly power raises price unilaterally. It does not first need to forecast whether rivals will follow. The SAC pleads the opposite. [SAC: "Project Nessie predicted the likelihood that the online store or stores offering the lowest price for a given product would follow an Amazon price increase."] Price increases were confined to products whose rivals matched: [SAC: "Amazon realized that it could increase its prices while reducing the risk of shoppers finding a lower price off Amazon if Amazon focused its price increases on products sold by competitors that were matching Amazon’s prices."] Where rivals did not follow, the SAC's premise is that shoppers would find the lower price elsewhere. That is the substitution the Plaintiffs say is absent.

Three further allegations point the same way:

• Scope was rationed to avoid switching. [SAC: "To minimize the risk of consumer backlash, Amazon limited and rotated the products subject to Project Nessie at any given time."] A firm free of competitive discipline has no reason to ration its price increases.
• The pleaded constraint is not limited to superstores. The algorithm tracked "the online store or stores offering the lowest price." The SAC does not confine those stores to online superstores, and the market it pleads excludes limited-selection stores.
• Overall sales growth does not measure substitution. Growth says nothing about where shoppers go when a particular price rises. On that question the record is silent.

The Plaintiffs' direct evidence therefore undercuts their own market definition. Amazon.com, Inc. concedes monopoly power in no market.

[PHASE CHECK] Both of the last two turns added new material. Plaintiffs' turn 6 answered the claim that the record is silent on substitution by citing Nessie profits, service degradation and fee hikes, and extended the argument to marketplace services. Amazon's turn 7 offered a new reading of Nessie as proof that rivals constrain it. Neither point has been answered.

The FTC-State Plaintiffs challenge Amazon's reading of Project Nessie. On the SAC's own figures, Nessie shows that Amazon raised prices profitably even when rivals did not follow.

Amazon's theory depends on rivals following. The record does not require it:

• Rivals needed to follow only a minority of the time. [SAC: "Amazon nonetheless decided that this risk was a worthwhile tradeoff if other online stores followed Amazon’s price increases at least 20% of the time."] On that threshold, most increases could go unmatched and still pay. A firm facing real substitution does not profit when four in five of its increases are undercut.
• Amazon accepted being the higher-priced store. [SAC: "Project Nessie sometimes caused Amazon to temporarily have higher prices than at least one other online store."] Amazon still earned [SAC: "an extra $363 million"] on reduced sales in a single year. Some sales were lost, but not enough to discipline the price.
• Rivals followed Amazon, not the reverse. Amazon's early experiments found that [SAC: "in many cases competitors match"] Amazon at the higher price. When smaller stores track a dominant firm's increases, that firm sets the market price level. That is price leadership, and it is evidence of monopoly power.

The rationing Amazon cites was not a response to competitive switching. The SAC ties the pauses to [SAC: "increased media focus and customer traffic"] and to [SAC: "regulatory scrutiny"]. Avoiding exposure is not the same as being disciplined by rivals.

Amazon's point about limited-selection stores cuts against Amazon. Stores that followed its increases amplified its prices rather than constraining them.

Nessie therefore confirms that no firm, inside or outside the pleaded market, disciplines Amazon's prices.

The full name of the defendant institution, Amazon.com, Inc. (Defendant, FTC et al. v. Amazon.com, Inc., No. 2:23-cv-01495-JHC, W.D. Wash.), challenges the Plaintiffs' fee evidence for the second market: the only fee hike cited is pleaded in a different market.

The Plaintiffs offered this as direct evidence of power in online marketplace services: [SAC: "Amazon has also hiked average fulfillment fees to sellers, which jumped approximately 30% between 2020 and 2022."] The SAC places fulfillment outside that market:

• Fulfillment is a separate pleaded market. [SAC: "Online retail fulfillment services are discrete and separate from online marketplace services."] The SAC also calls it an add-on: [SAC: "Some providers of online marketplace services also offer fulfillment services, which sellers can purchase in addition to online marketplace services."] A price increase in one market does not prove power in another.
• The take-rate figure blends markets. The Plaintiffs rely on [SAC: "Amazon’s average take rate for sellers who use FBA increased from 27.6% in 2014"]. That figure folds fulfillment and advertising charges into marketplace fees and covers only FBA sellers. It does not isolate the price of the pleaded product.
• The SAC's own boundary admits substitution. [SAC: "Many merchants prefer purchasing online marketplace services to vending to a retailer so that they can retain the ability to set their own prices to final customers."] "Many" is not all. Some merchants choose vending, and the marketplace definition excludes that marginal substitution.

The record is silent on any sellers failing to escape a change in the price of marketplace services, taken apart from fulfillment and advertising. The second market therefore lacks both a proven boundary and proven power. Amazon.com, Inc. concedes monopoly power in no market.

[PHASE CHECK] Turn 10 raised a new attack on the second market that Plaintiffs have not answered. It argues that the fee-hike and take-rate evidence belongs to the separately pleaded fulfillment market or blends several markets, and that vending is a substitute for marketplace services. Turn 9 also added new Nessie record citations.

The FTC-State Plaintiffs challenge Amazon's claim that the fulfillment fee belongs to a separate market. On this record, that fee is part of the price sellers pay for full marketplace access.

Amazon calls fulfillment an optional add-on. The pleaded record says otherwise: [SAC: "Amazon effectively forces sellers to purchase its fulfillment services to access the full reach of Amazon’s marketplace services that Prime eligibility unlocks."] A charge that conditions full access is part of the effective price of that access, however it is booked. Advertising is the same: [SAC: "Advertisements are now no longer a discretionary purchase but instead a necessary cost of doing business."]

The blended take rate therefore measures the right thing: the total price of reaching Amazon's shoppers. Amazon identifies no seller who obtains that access without these charges. Higher fees have not driven sellers away:

• [SAC: "By comparison, Amazon’s take rate is higher than its rivals."]
• [SAC: "The fact that such low-margin sellers remain on Amazon even as Amazon takes an ever-greater cut of their revenues shows Amazon’s monopoly power."]
• [SAC: "Many sellers have unfavorable views of Amazon but continue to use Amazon because there are no viable alternatives."]

Vending does not discipline these fees because it is a different product: [SAC: "A vendor usually gives up the ability to set the price offered to shoppers"]. That some merchants accept this loss of pricing control does not show that marketplace sellers switch when fees rise. The record is silent on any such switching.

The structural evidence stands independently. Amazon's marketplace share [SAC: "grew to more than 71% by 2022."] The pleaded market boundary and monopoly power both hold.

Amazon.com, Inc. (Defendant, FTC et al. v. Amazon.com, Inc., No. 2:23-cv-01495-JHC, W.D. Wash.) challenges the Plaintiffs' reply. Folding the fulfillment fee into the price of marketplace services contradicts the SAC's own two-product theory.

The Plaintiffs now treat the fulfillment charge as part of the effective price of marketplace access. On demand, the dimension that defines a market, the SAC pleads the opposite:

• [SAC: "Demand for online retail fulfillment services is separate from demand for online marketplace services."]
• [SAC: "Sellers often choose to purchase these services separately."]
• The Plaintiffs' conduct theory depends on that separation: [SAC: "Thus, Amazon’s tying of Prime eligibility to FBA usage raises the cost of multihoming"]. A tie requires two products.

The Plaintiffs cannot call fulfillment a distinct product to plead a tie and then the same product to prove power. If demand for fulfillment is separate, the pleaded rise of roughly 30% in fulfillment fees is evidence about fulfillment, not marketplace services. The blended take rate then measures a bundle of markets, not the pleaded one.

The Plaintiffs also asserted that no seller obtains access without these charges. The SAC itself is narrower:

• It pleads only that Amazon is [SAC: "generally conditioning that access on use of Amazon’s proprietary fulfillment service, FBA"].
• [SAC: "At its peak, approximately 15,000 sellers had enrolled in SFP."]

The Plaintiffs' direct evidence for the second market is therefore either a price drawn from another market or an overstatement of their own pleading. What remains is a share figure whose denominator the Plaintiffs defined. The Defendant concedes monopoly power in no market.

[PHASE CHECK] Turn 13 raised a new point with fresh citations: pleading fulfillment as a separate product for tying conflicts with folding its fee into marketplace price. It also cited SFP enrollment against the claim that no seller has access without FBA. Turn 12 added the rival take-rate comparison. Plaintiffs have not answered the tie contradiction.

The FTC-State Plaintiffs challenge Amazon's claim of contradiction. A tie does not split the price of marketplace access. It is the means by which that price is collected.

Separate demand for fulfillment establishes that fulfillment is a distinct product. It does not establish that the tied charge falls outside what sellers pay to reach Amazon's shoppers. When full access is conditioned on buying a second product, the conditioned purchase is part of the cost of access. The tie claim and the power claim therefore rest on one consistent premise.

The record also shows power in marketplace services without any fulfillment charge. Amazon's own fee structure includes a charge on every sale: Amazon [SAC: "charges all sellers a commission or “referral fee” based on the price of each item sold on Amazon."] The SAC pleads that [SAC: "As a practical matter, most sellers must pay these four fees to make a significant volume of sales on Amazon."] Amazon identifies no seller who left the marketplace over those fees.

Seller Fulfilled Prime confirms control rather than defeating it:

• At its peak the program covered about 15,000 sellers. Against that, [SAC: "As of the first quarter of 2021, there were over 560,000 active sellers on Amazon’s U.S. Marketplace."]
• [SAC: "Most remaining SFP sellers have since left or been disqualified from the program."]
• [SAC: "As of this filing, SFP enrollment remains closed."]

A firm that can close the only alternative path to Prime eligibility without losing its sellers has monopoly power. Both pleaded markets and monopoly power in each stand proven.

Amazon.com, Inc. (Defendant, FTC et al. v. Amazon.com, Inc., No. 2:23-cv-01495-JHC, W.D. Wash.) challenges Plaintiffs' reliance on the referral fee. The record pleads that the fee exists, not that it rose.

The referral fee is the only charge Plaintiffs isolate as a pure marketplace price, yet the SAC pleads no increase in it. It treats that fee as the baseline from which other charges grew: [SAC: "Before Amazon decided to prioritize advertisements as a way to generate revenue, sellers were able to access prominent and valuable search page placement by paying just Amazon’s referral and sales fees."] By Plaintiffs' own account, the increase lies in advertising, which is a separately priced service.

The "four fees" sentence brings back the blend that Plaintiffs set aside, because two of those four fees are [SAC: "Third, Amazon charges sellers for the use of Amazon’s fulfillment and delivery services. Fourth, Amazon charges sellers for advertising services."] A figure that needs fulfillment and advertising to show power over marketplace services is not direct evidence of that power.

The absence of seller-exit evidence does not shift the burden either. Plaintiffs [DKT-289: "must prove that Amazon has monopoly power in a properly defined antitrust market"].

With no pleaded price increase in the isolated product, the second market rests on a single share figure calculated over a denominator Plaintiffs chose. Amazon.com, Inc. (Defendant, FTC et al. v. Amazon.com, Inc., No. 2:23-cv-01495-JHC, W.D. Wash.) concedes monopoly power in no market.

[PHASE CHECK] Both of the last two turns added new material. Plaintiffs isolated the referral fee and cited SFP's scale (15,000 of 560,000 sellers; enrollment closed). Amazon replied with a new point: the SAC pleads no referral-fee increase and treats that fee as a baseline. Plaintiffs have not yet answered that point.

The FTC-State Plaintiffs challenge Amazon's reading of the referral-fee sentence. It pleads a price increase for the same marketplace service.

Amazon's quotation sets the baseline: [SAC: "Before Amazon decided to prioritize advertisements as a way to generate revenue, sellers were able to access prominent and valuable search page placement by paying just Amazon’s referral and sales fees."] Prominent search placement is the core of online marketplace services, because it is how a seller's product gets discovered. That same placement now carries an added charge: [SAC: "Advertisements are now no longer a discretionary purchase but instead a necessary cost of doing business."] The pleaded gap: advertised products are [SAC: "46 times more likely to be clicked on when compared with products that are not advertised."] Calling the charge "advertising" does not remove it from the price of discoverability. The SAC measures the resulting take rate [SAC: "for essentially the same services."] A higher charge for an unchanged service is a price increase.

Amazon's claim that the second market rests on a denominator Plaintiffs chose also fails on the record. The figure is third-party: [SAC: "According to commercially available data sources"], Amazon has held [SAC: "a market share of greater than 66% of marketplace sales, as measured by GMV, across all tracked marketplaces since at least 2018"]. A durable share at that level, together with pleaded [SAC: "scale economies, switching costs, and network effects"], establishes monopoly power structurally, independent of any fee trend.

Monopoly power in online marketplace services therefore rests on two grounds, each sufficient alone: a price increase for an unchanged service, and a durable third-party-measured share protected by pleaded entry barriers.

Amazon.com, Inc. (Defendant, FTC et al. v. Amazon.com, Inc., No. 2:23-cv-01495-JHC, W.D. Wash.) challenges the claim that the advertising charge is a monopoly price for discoverability. On the SAC's own pleaded mechanism, sellers bidding against one another set that charge. Amazon does not dictate it.

The SAC pleads how the charge is set: [SAC: "Amazon also transitioned its advertising business from a direct sales model to an auction model where sellers bid against other sellers for advertisement placement."] Three consequences follow.

• The price reflects rivalry among sellers. An auction price rises as more sellers bid for a slot. Bidding intensity says nothing about whether sellers could turn to another marketplace.
• The "46 times" figure measures relative position on one platform. It compares advertised and unadvertised products on Amazon. It shows which seller wins placement, not that sellers lack outside alternatives.
• The SAC concedes that advertising has independent value. [SAC: "In theory, relevant advertisements can be useful to shoppers in some instances."] A separately valued service bought at auction is not a disguised increase in the referral fee.

The "essentially the same services" take-rate figure is also limited [SAC: "for sellers who use FBA"]. That limitation brings back the fulfillment component that Plaintiffs claimed to set aside.

What remains is a share figure and pleaded barriers, with no isolated price increase in the pleaded product. As DKT-289 records, Amazon's position is that Plaintiffs [DKT-289: "must prove that Amazon has monopoly power in a properly defined antitrust market"]. Amazon.com, Inc. (Defendant, FTC et al. v. Amazon.com, Inc., No. 2:23-cv-01495-JHC, W.D. Wash.) concedes monopoly power in no market.

[PHASE CHECK] Both of the last two turns added new material. Turn 18 recast the advertising charge as a price increase for discoverability and cited the 46x figure and a third-party share source. Turn 19 answered with a new SAC citation: the auction model, where sellers bid against sellers. Plaintiffs have not yet responded to the auction point.

The FTC-State Plaintiffs challenge Amazon's auction defense. An auction allocates only the supply the auctioneer offers, and on this record Amazon controls both supply and rules.

• Amazon sets the supply. It sought to grow advertising by increasing [SAC: "the number of advertising placements and supply of impressions"]. It also controlled [SAC: "a tool that could determine how many search page slots were allocated to advertisements"]. Converting organic placement into auctioned placement is a unilateral pricing decision. Seller rivalry merely fills the slots Amazon chose to sell.
• Amazon writes the rules. [SAC: "Amazon ultimately revised its ad auction to incorporate the “cost of defect” in order to make the most money from its ad auctions."] An auction redesigned to maximize the auctioneer's take does not produce a neutral market price.
• Amazon refused any limit. Its guidance was that [SAC: "advertising should not be constrained by additional guardrails"]. A marketplace that feared losing sellers or shoppers to rivals would ration the added charge. Amazon did the opposite.

The charge is layered on the fee, not substituted for it. Sellers [SAC: "have to pay per click for preferred Search and Detail Page placement in addition to the fixed commission Amazon charges per sale"]. The result: [SAC: "Most sellers must now pay for advertising to reach Amazon’s massive base of online shoppers"].

Sellers bid harder rather than leave, which confirms they have no alternatives. A firm that can manufacture scarcity in its own storefront and auction it without losing sellers holds monopoly power in online marketplace services.

Amazon.com, Inc. (Defendant, FTC et al. v. Amazon.com, Inc., No. 2:23-cv-01495-JHC, W.D. Wash.) challenges the premise that sellers lack alternatives. Plaintiffs' conduct theory depends on lower-cost seller channels that the pleaded marketplace-services market excludes.

The SAC removes direct-to-consumer stores from the market. Its anti-discounting theory, however, treats those same channels as live routes to U.S. shoppers:

• [SAC: "Amazon’s penalties effectively deter sellers from offering prices elsewhere that are lower than their prices on Amazon, even where their costs are lower through other online sales channels."]
• [SAC: "Similar anticompetitive effects flow from ASB, which contractually prevents brands from offering lower prices elsewhere online even when it would be profitable for them to do so, including on their own websites."]

A channel that costs sellers less, and that Amazon allegedly must police, constrains the price of marketplace access. Plaintiffs cannot cast sellers' own websites as the competition Amazon suppresses and also exclude them as non-substitutes.

The SAC's stated ground for exclusion describes a cost, not an absence of substitution: [SAC: "Rather, merchants that use SaaS providers to establish direct-to-consumer online stores must invest in marketing and promotion to attract U.S. shoppers to their online stores."] Customer-acquisition spending is the price of an alternative route to the same shoppers. That is exactly the margin on which sellers weigh Amazon's fees.

The "tracked marketplaces" share therefore omits the channel that Plaintiffs' own theory treats as the disciplining force. That share cannot establish power in a properly defined market. Amazon.com, Inc. (Defendant, FTC et al. v. Amazon.com, Inc., No. 2:23-cv-01495-JHC, W.D. Wash.) concedes monopoly power in no market.

[PHASE CHECK] Both of the last two turns added new material. Plaintiffs' turn 21 argued that Amazon controls ad supply and auction rules, citing the cost-of-defect and guardrails passages. Amazon's turn 22 argued that sellers' own direct-to-consumer and SaaS stores are disciplining substitutes that the anti-discounting theory relies on. Plaintiffs have not yet answered that point.

The FTC-State Plaintiffs challenge Amazon's claim that sellers' own websites discipline marketplace fees. On this record, those channels supplement Amazon rather than replace it, and sellers have not switched to them when fees rose.

A substitute for marketplace services is a channel sellers turn to instead of Amazon when Amazon's fees rise. The SAC pleads the opposite response.

• Sellers raise prices elsewhere rather than leave. [SAC: "many sellers set their price on Amazon—high fees and all—as the price floor across the internet."] A seller that passes Amazon's fee onto its own website keeps buying Amazon's service at the higher price.
• Some sellers abandon the other channels entirely. [SAC: "Some sellers cope by simply not selling anywhere other than Amazon."] Sellers drop the outside channel and keep Amazon. Substitution would run the other way.
• Lower outside costs never discipline Amazon's fees. [SAC: "Rivals no longer compete to offer sellers lower fees, since Amazon’s anti-discounting conduct prevents sellers from passing those savings on to shoppers."] Amazon's fees rose rather than fell.

Amazon's reading of the exclusion also fails. Amazon treats customer-acquisition spending as the cost of an alternative route, but that spending is the distinguishing feature itself: [SAC: "SaaS providers, unlike online marketplace service providers, do not provide access to an established U.S. customer base."] Access to an established customer base is the product. A route that requires a seller to build that base from scratch is a different product, and building it is the entry barrier the SAC pleads.

These theories are consistent. Amazon polices complementary channels so that they never grow into substitutes. The share figure measures the market correctly.

Amazon.com, Inc. (Defendant, FTC et al. v. Amazon.com, Inc., No. 2:23-cv-01495-JHC, W.D. Wash.) challenges a boundary the Plaintiffs have not defended: the SAC's perishable-grocery carve-out contradicts the demand rationale that defines the superstore market.

That market rests on one-stop shopping: [SAC: "Many consumers also value shopping for different types of goods at a single store to reduce overall shopping costs."] The SAC then removes a category those superstores sell to the same shoppers: [SAC: "Online purchases of perishable grocery products are not part of the online superstore market."]

The stated grounds concern supply, not substitution:

• Logistics. [SAC: "Perishable groceries require special handling, often including refrigeration or freezing"]. Refrigeration is a supply cost, not a separate demand.
• Pricing geography. [SAC: "Competition for online perishable grocery sales is generally more localized, whereas online superstore competition is nationwide."] This describes how suppliers price, not whether a shopper building one basket treats groceries as a separate trip.

The one shopper-side point, choosing a delivery time slot, is a scheduling feature. It does not show that shoppers split their baskets.

A market defined by basket-building cannot drop part of the basket whenever fulfillment differs. The carve-out also carries into every figure: [SAC: "this distinct business line is not part of the relevant market and is excluded from the market share numbers in Part V.A.2, below."] The record is silent on shares with this category included.

Every cited share therefore rests on a second contested exclusion. The Defendant concedes monopoly power in no market.

[PHASE CHECK] Turn 25 raised a new, unanswered challenge: the SAC's perishable-grocery carve-out allegedly conflicts with the one-stop-shopping demand rationale and is built into every cited share. Turn 24 also added new record citations on seller channel behavior. Plaintiffs have not yet joined issue on the grocery exclusion.

The FTC-State Plaintiffs challenge Amazon's claim that the perishable-grocery carve-out rests only on supply. The SAC pleads a shopper-side difference, and Amazon's own pricing confirms it.

• Demand differs. [SAC: "Consumers’ experiences when shopping online for perishable groceries differ from their experiences purchasing other retail goods."] A delivery slot is more than a scheduling detail. It often ties the shopper to the home, [SAC: "which often also requires the customer to be present at the time of delivery to be able to promptly store those items."] That is a different transaction from the on-demand basket that defines an online superstore.
• Amazon's own conduct draws the line. [SAC: "Neither Walmart.com nor Amazon typically require shoppers to choose time slots when purchasing other products online."] More telling: [SAC: "As a result, Amazon generally sets regional prices for perishable grocery items, whereas items Amazon sells through its online superstore usually have a single, nationwide price."] A firm that prices one category regionally and everything else nationally faces different competitive conditions in each. Amazon's own price-setting treats groceries as a separate arena.
• The carve-out cannot manufacture power. Excluding a category removes sales from both Amazon's numerator and the denominator. Amazon cites nothing in the record showing its perishable-grocery position is weaker, or that including the category would pull its share below monopoly levels. The record is silent on that point, and silence does not rebut a pleaded share "well above 60%."
• The second market is untouched. The carve-out has no bearing on online marketplace services.

Both pleaded markets, and monopoly power in each, stand as pleaded.

Amazon.com, Inc. (Defendant, FTC et al. v. Amazon.com, Inc., No. 2:23-cv-01495-JHC, W.D. Wash.) challenges Plaintiffs' premise that no rival disciplines Amazon's superstore offering. The SAC's own Prime allegations name an existing rival, and they plead that Amazon's product design responds to it.

The SAC attributes the decision to keep Prime whole to a concern about substitution. On that pleading, separate offerings would [SAC: "make it easier for customers to substitute components of a bundle outside Amazon, (e.g., Netflix + [Prime] Shopping only or [Prime] Entertainment + [Walmart+])"].

• The pleaded substitute already exists. The allegation identifies a current rival superstore's shipping subscription as a ready alternative to Amazon's shopping benefits. Plaintiffs allege that Amazon shapes its core offering around customers switching to a named competitor. On that pleading, the named competitor constrains Amazon.
• Rival offerings are pleaded as comparable. The SAC states that [SAC: "Even firms that have introduced comparable subscription services at a fraction of the price have struggled to make serious inroads."] Comparable rival services at lower prices describe competition on the merits. How well those rivals perform is a separate question from whether substitutes exist.
• Plaintiffs' exclusion theory depends on that rivalry. The alleged barrier works only if shoppers would otherwise move to rival superstores. Plaintiffs cannot invoke that substitution to plead exclusion and then disclaim it to prove power.

On Plaintiffs' own account, the superstore allegations describe a firm responding to rival substitution, not a firm free of competitive discipline. Amazon.com, Inc. (Defendant, FTC et al. v. Amazon.com, Inc., No. 2:23-cv-01495-JHC, W.D. Wash.) concedes monopoly power in no market.

The simulated bench finds for Plaintiffs on this phase issue. This is a simulated fictional output, not a prediction of any real ruling.

Burden. Plaintiffs bear the burden. They "must prove that Amazon has monopoly power in a properly defined antitrust market" [DKT-289]. Under the trial premise, the SAC's allegations are the record unless the SAC, DKT-159 or DKT-289 contradicts them.

Online superstore market. The market rests on a distinct demand feature. Online superstores "compete to build long-term relationships with consumers across multiple purchases of a variety of items" [SAC].

Amazon's challenges are inferences, not contradictions:

• The SAC concedes that other stores "may price certain items comparably with online superstores" [SAC]. It also states that shoppers "do not seriously consider those stores as reasonable alternatives" [SAC].
• Physical stores serve as a benchmark in Amazon's documents. Being a benchmark does not make them substitutes.
• The grocery carve-out is supported by the finding that "Amazon generally sets regional prices for perishable grocery items" [SAC].
• The Walmart+ allegation is paired with the finding that rivals "have struggled to make serious inroads" [SAC].

The record contains no quantitative cross-elasticity evidence. The direct evidence fills that gap. Nessie "generated enormous profits for Amazon even though its higher prices caused Amazon’s unit sales to decrease" [SAC]. Amazon degraded quality while "not losing meaningful numbers of shoppers to rivals" [SAC]. The 20% follow-rate threshold does not show that rivals disciplined Amazon's prices.

Shares. Amazon's share is "well above 60%—and rising" [SAC]. On an admittedly overinclusive set, "Amazon still had a 60.8% share" [SAC]. No measure in the record falls below that level.

Marketplace services. "SaaS providers, unlike online marketplace service providers, do not provide access to an established U.S. customer base" [SAC]. Amazon's argument that fulfillment fees belong to a separate market has some force against the fee-increase evidence. However, power does not depend on those fees. Amazon holds "a market share of greater than 66% of marketplace sales" [SAC], measured by third-party data and protected by pleaded barriers.

The direct-to-consumer channel argument is not supported by the record. The SAC pleads that sellers keep Amazon and set their prices elsewhere to match it, rather than leaving Amazon for those channels.

Conclusion. Both markets are valid on this record, and Amazon holds monopoly power in each.

The FTC-State Plaintiffs open on liability. Each challenged practice impairs rivals, and Amazon's own evidence defeats its justifications.

The governing test reaches acts that [DKT-289: "tend[ ] to impair the opportunities of rivals and do[ ] not further competition on the merits or do[ ] so in an unnecessarily restrictive way"]. Both practices fail it.

Anti-discounting. SC-FOD [SAC: "disqualifies a seller’s offer from winning the Buy Box if Amazon detects a price that is lower—even by a penny"]. Amazon defends this as steering shoppers to low prices. Amazon's own internal memo refutes that defense: Buy Box disqualification [SAC: "has not led Sellers to lower their prices"]. A penalty that yields no lower prices on Amazon and higher prices elsewhere is not competition on the merits. No price-cost test applies either, because the Court has ruled that Plaintiffs [DKT-289: "do not assert a predatory pricing claim and thus Brooke Group does not foreclose the type of Section 2 Sherman Act claim that they bring here"].

Prime eligibility tied to FBA. Amazon's shipping-quality defense fails on Amazon's own data: [SAC: "SFP sellers using independent fulfillment providers satisfied Amazon’s delivery requirement 98.4% of the time"]. That less restrictive alternative existed and outperformed the SFP average. Amazon closed it anyway, at a meeting titled [SAC: "3PL impact mitigation"]. The purpose was exclusion, not quality.

The record supports the pleaded conclusion: [SAC: "Amazon’s anticompetitive conduct is not reasonably necessary to achieve any cognizable procompetitive benefits."]

The question for Amazon is this: what procompetitive benefit did closing SFP to independent fulfillment providers achieve that their 98.4% delivery performance did not already deliver?

Amazon.com, Inc. answers the Plaintiffs' question: the 98.4% figure does not establish an equally effective alternative, because the record never measures it against FBA.

A less restrictive alternative must achieve the same benefit. The record does not show that it does.

• No FBA benchmark. The figure is compared only with other SFP sellers: [SAC: "(compared to 96% for all SFP sellers)"]. The record is silent on FBA's delivery rate for that quarter. Exceeding the SFP average does not show parity with the service promised to Prime subscribers.
• The SAC's only SFP-to-FBA comparison is qualified. The SAC pleads merely that [SAC: "At times, these sellers outperformed FBA-fulfilled orders on this metric."] "At times" is not "consistently," and the SAC does not quantify it.
• One quarter, one subset. The figure covers a single period, [SAC: "in the last quarter before Amazon suspended enrollment"], and only sellers using independent providers. The lower program-wide figure shows uneven performance across SFP.
• Quality enforcement. Prime eligibility required sellers to [SAC: "meet a high bar for shipping speed and consistency"]. The seller complaints the SAC recites, [SAC: "concerns that Amazon holds SFP sellers to stricter delivery benchmarks than FBA"], describe enforcement of that bar. They are not evidence of pretext.

The Court records Amazon's stated reason for the pause as [DKT-289: "a temporary step taken to address speed and performance issues"]. The Plaintiffs' figures do not refute that reason. They show SFP performance varied. The Plaintiffs have not demonstrated an equally effective, less restrictive alternative.

The FTC-State Plaintiffs challenge Amazon's quality defense. On this record, Amazon restricted the better-performing fulfillment path and spared the weaker one. A quality rationale cannot explain that.

Amazon's own analysis ranked the two SFP paths: [SAC: "Amazon’s internal analyses showed that sellers using independent fulfillment services met Amazon’s stringent SFP standards more often than sellers fulfilling orders themselves."] Amazon then did the opposite of what quality enforcement would require: [SAC: "Critically, Amazon communicated to those sellers who were already in SFP that it expected them to fulfill orders themselves, rather than using independent fulfillment providers."]

A firm policing speed and consistency would restrict the lower-performing group. Amazon kept that group and excluded the higher-performing one. That choice does not depend on any FBA benchmark. The variable Amazon acted on was the identity of the fulfiller, not delivery performance.

The pleaded record also contradicts the claim that the closure served shoppers. Amazon decided with knowledge of the cost: [SAC: "Amazon knew closing SFP would harm its shoppers by reducing the number of Prime-eligible offers available to Prime subscribers and slow overall shipping speeds for products sold on Amazon."] A step expected to slow shipping cannot be justified as protecting shipping speed.

Amazon's reliance on DKT-289 misreads it. The phrase "a temporary step taken to address speed and performance issues" is Amazon's briefing as quoted by the Court, not a finding. The Court confined itself to the pleading: [DKT-289: "on an MTD the court limits its consideration to the facts alleged in the complaint."]

The pleaded facts support exclusionary purpose. On this record, Amazon's justification is pretextual.

Amazon.com, Inc. challenges the Plaintiffs' anti-discounting theory. On the SAC's own causal account, fee levels keep prices from falling, not the featuring rule. Setting fee levels is not exclusionary conduct.

The Plaintiffs rely on the internal finding that Buy Box disqualification did not lower prices on Amazon. The SAC itself supplies the reason:

• The SAC names fees as the cause. [SAC: "Amazon understands that its anti-discounting strategy generally does not have the effect of lowering prices on Amazon because sellers must pay the high fees charged by Amazon."]
• The rule invites a lower Amazon price. [SAC: "Although Amazon tells sellers they can regain Buy Box eligibility by lowering their Amazon price, the sky-high fees Amazon charges sellers often put this option out of reach unless sellers are willing to sell at a loss."] As pleaded, the featuring rule points sellers toward the lowest price. The obstacle the SAC identifies is the fee.
• Fee levels are not the offense, even on the Plaintiffs' premise. [DKT-289: "The mere possession of monopoly power, and the concomitant charging of monopoly prices, is not only not unlawful; it is an important element of the free-market system."] Amazon.com, Inc. concedes no monopoly power. Even on the Plaintiffs' framing, a harm that runs through fee levels attacks pricing, not exclusion.

Remove fees from the account, and the SAC leaves only a storefront that declines to feature an offer sold for less elsewhere. The record does not separate any exclusionary effect of that rule from the fee levels the SAC names as the cause. The Plaintiffs have not carried their burden on the anti-discounting mechanism.

[PHASE CHECK] Both recent turns add new material. Plaintiffs argue pretext: Amazon excluded the better-performing independent-fulfillment path, knowingly slowed shipping, and DKT-289 only quotes Amazon's briefing. Amazon argues fees, not the featuring rule, keep prices up, citing the Trinko passage in DKT-289. Neither point has been answered, and ASB/CXA, the first-party algorithm and cumulative effects are unaddressed.

The FTC-State Plaintiffs challenge Amazon's causal split. The fees explain why Amazon's price stays high. The featuring rule explains why prices elsewhere cannot fall below it. That second effect is the exclusion.

Without the rule, high fees would work against Amazon. The SAC pleads the competitive response that fees alone would trigger: [SAC: "if those superstores can offer sellers lower fees, sellers could offer shoppers lower prices while making the same or a higher profit margin"]. Rivals would then win on price.

The rule closes that route. [SAC: "Amazon has destroyed this competitive dynamic by algorithmically forcing sellers to ensure that their prices off Amazon are no lower than their prices on Amazon, regardless of the relative costs."] The words "regardless of the relative costs" separate the two causes. The fee sets Amazon's price. The penalty makes that price the floor on rivals' sites.

The record shows harm to rivals that does not depend on fee levels. In the Zulily episode, [SAC: "Zulily’s suppliers told Zulily that they lost the Buy Box on Amazon because of Zulily’s discounted prices, and that they could not afford to lose their Amazon sales."] That harm came from penalizing a rival's lower price, not from any change in Amazon's fees.

Amazon says the rule only declines to feature an offer. The Court already rejected that as a reading of the pleading: [DKT-289: "They have alleged that Amazon actively deters third-party sellers from offering lower prices for their products on sites other than Amazon’s."]

The Plaintiffs do not challenge Amazon's fees as the offense. They challenge the conduct that prevents rivals from undercutting those fees.

Amazon.com, Inc. (Defendant, FTC et al. v. Amazon.com, Inc., No. 2:23-cv-01495-JHC, W.D. Wash.) challenges Plaintiffs' reliance on [SAC: "regardless of the relative costs"]. Shoppers see prices, not seller costs. A featuring rule keyed to price is competition on the merit shoppers actually observe.

• The trigger is a lower price available to the shopper. SC-FOD acts only when Amazon [SAC: "detects a price that is lower—even by a penny"]. The offer withheld from the Buy Box is, by definition, not the best deal the shopper can reach. Featuring it would recommend a higher price.
• The SAC records the consumer rationale. The ASB sanction messages Plaintiffs quote gave this reason: [SAC: "customers considering your products could have easily found your products cheaper at another major retailer, and may have chosen to shop elsewhere."] Amazon's briefing said the same: [DKT-289: "by not featuring offers when it knows a competitor is offering a better price in another store, Amazon both builds trust with consumers and facilitates the comparison-shopping that the Complaint itself acknowledges is necessary for retailers to compete."]
• DKT-289 made no merits finding. The Court held that [DKT-289: "on an MTD the court limits its consideration to the facts alleged in the complaint."] Any DKT-289 passage Plaintiffs invoke restates the allegation. It does not adjudicate purpose.

Seller costs are private, and a storefront cannot feature offers based on information it does not see. Plaintiffs identify no less restrictive rule that would feature an offer while being truthful about a lower price elsewhere. The mechanism has not been shown to be exclusionary rather than a truthful price signal.

[PHASE CHECK] Both final turns added new material. Plaintiffs used the 'regardless of the relative costs' language and Zulily supplier evidence to separate fee effects from the featuring rule. Amazon countered that price-keyed featuring is a truthful consumer signal and challenged Plaintiffs to identify a less restrictive rule. Several liability strands remain unjoined.

The FTC-State Plaintiffs challenge Amazon's "truthful price signal" defense. On this record, the rule hides prices rather than revealing them.

A truthful signal would tell shoppers that a lower price exists elsewhere. The SAC pleads the opposite.

• It erases the Amazon price. [SAC: "Still another is to erase a product’s price from public view, even if the offer is the best deal available on Amazon."] Another pleaded penalty is [SAC: "hiding their prices on the Search Results Page"]. The shopper never sees the cheaper outside offer and loses sight of the best offer on Amazon.
• It withholds information from sellers by design. [SAC: "Amazon does not, however, tell the seller where it found the lower price."] The pleaded reason is [SAC: "Amazon deliberately withholds the source of the lower price to foster the impression that a lower price anywhere online will tank a product’s Amazon sales, chilling discounting far and wide."] Withholding the source serves deterrence, not accuracy.
• Amazon suppressed a rival's truthful comparison. Zulily displayed its lower prices beside Amazon's. The SAC calls this [SAC: "This is a classic form of price competition that should flourish in a competitive market."] Amazon responded as follows: [SAC: "To Amazon, this price competition was intolerable—and so it set out to destroy it."]

On less restrictive alternatives, the SAC pleads that [SAC: "Amazon could reasonably achieve any procompetitive goals through less restrictive alternatives."] Amazon identifies nothing in the record that contradicts that allegation. A senior executive also described the expansion in exclusionary terms: [SAC: "Amazon expanded this designation to make “the punitive aspect” of SC-FOD “more effective.”"] That is the language of punishment, not of informing shoppers.

Amazon.com, Inc. addresses the first-party pricing algorithm. As pleaded, that algorithm is matching competition, not exclusion.

Every rival discount reaches Amazon shoppers. The SAC pleads that [SAC: "If Amazon detects a “lowest price” drop, Amazon automatically copies that move."] A mechanism that passes each rival price cut on to Amazon customers is price competition.

Amazon's price never exceeds the rival's. The algorithm operates by [SAC: "copying—but never undercutting—prices."] When the lowest price rises, the rival has set the new level. Amazon's price follows it and does not lead it.

The pleaded injury falls on rivals' margins, not on consumers. The SAC's theory is that rivals learn their [SAC: "price cuts do not result in greater market share or scale, only lower margins."] A rival that gains no share because a competitor matched its price has lost on the merits. The authority the Court recited warns that [DKT-289: "allowing such claims could, perversely, chill legitimate price cutting, which directly benefits consumers."]

DKT-289 did not decide the merits. The Court held only that Plaintiffs [DKT-289: "do not assert a predatory pricing claim and thus Brooke Group does not foreclose the type of Section 2 Sherman Act claim that they bring here."] That ruling kept the claim alive at the pleading stage. It made no finding that matching prices is exclusionary.

The pleaded mechanism caps Amazon's price at the lowest monitored price. As pleaded, this algorithm, unlike the separately pleaded Project Nessie, never sets Amazon's first-party price above that level. Plaintiffs have not carried their burden to show that this element of the anti-discounting theory is exclusionary conduct.

[PHASE CHECK] Both recent turns add material new content. Plaintiffs' turn 38 cites price-erasure, source-withholding and 'punitive aspect' allegations against the truthful-signal defense. Amazon's turn 39 opens a new front: the first-party matching algorithm. Plaintiffs have not yet answered it, and several liability elements remain unjoined.

The FTC-State Plaintiffs challenge Amazon's claim that the first-party algorithm caps prices. As pleaded, it follows increases as readily as cuts. Its design purpose and its pleaded effect are fewer discounts.

• It follows prices upward. [SAC: "And if the “lowest price” increases, Amazon automatically copies again without even considering whether it could earn more business by continuing to offer shoppers the lower price."] A firm competing to win business on price does not give up a price advantage the moment it holds one.
• It was designed to suppress competition. Amazon [SAC: "uses a “game theory approach” where Amazon will “never move first” when it comes to lowering prices."] The algorithm exists [SAC: "to avoid a “perfectly competitive market” in which rivals continually lower their prices, benefiting shoppers but competing away profits."] The predicted result [SAC: "is that “prices will go up.”"] The Court held that [DKT-289: "evidence of intent is . . . relevant to the question whether the challenged conduct is fairly characterized as ‘exclusionary’"].
• Consumers lost discounts, not only rivals' margins. Amazon found the algorithm created a [SAC: "“financial disincentive for Walmart”"]. As a result, [SAC: "Walmart ultimately discounted hundreds of thousands fewer products than it had initially planned."] Against Zulily, it produced [SAC: "“continuous price spirals” that resulted in Zulily dropping the products from its online store."] Fewer discounts and less output are harms to consumers.

The Brooke Group concern about chilling legitimate price cutting does not apply. On this record, chilling price cuts is the function the algorithm was built to perform.

Amazon.com, Inc. challenges Plaintiffs' reply. Every harm they cite flows from Amazon meeting a rival's price. Condemning that response would impose a duty to undercut, which Section 2 does not require.

• Upward following is still parity. As pleaded, Amazon [SAC: "automatically increases its Retail price to copy the new lowest price"]. The rival, not Amazon, sets that level. Amazon's first-party price tracks the lowest monitored price. No rival is barred from cutting again, and each cut is matched on Amazon.
• The Zulily "spirals" were falling prices. The SAC pleads that [SAC: "Zulily tried to respond by further reducing its prices, but Amazon rapidly copied Zulily’s prices with predictable consequences"]. Successive price cuts are the outcome antitrust law protects. A rival that withdraws products after each cut is met has lost on price, not been excluded.
• Reduced discounting by Walmart follows from meeting competition. Any rival discounts less when it expects its discounts to be matched. On Plaintiffs' theory, every firm that meets a competitor's price would face liability.
• Intent cannot convert matching into exclusion. The Court described intent as [DKT-289: "relevant to the question whether the challenged conduct is fairly characterized as ‘exclusionary’"]. Relevance is not sufficiency. The design statements the SAC attributes to a former executive do not change the conduct. That conduct is offering shoppers the lowest posted rival price, and such conduct is not conduct that [DKT-289: "do[ ] not further competition on the merits"].

Plaintiffs plead no instance of this algorithm pricing above the lowest monitored price. Project Nessie is pleaded separately. The first-party matching element fails as exclusionary conduct.

[PHASE CHECK] Turns 41–42 added new material on the first-party algorithm: upward-following and design-intent citations, the Walmart discount-reduction evidence, and Amazon's 'duty to undercut' and falling-price reframing of Zulily. Several liability components have not been argued: ASB/CXA contractual parity, Project Nessie under Section 5, and cumulative effect.

The FTC-State Plaintiffs reject judging the first-party algorithm in isolation. On this record it never operated alone.

The SAC pleads the combination: [SAC: "the whole of their combined anticompetitive impact is significantly greater than the sum of their individual effects."] The Court held that [DKT-289: "it need not reach, at this point, the issue whether Defendants’ conduct should be considered cumulatively"]. The trial record answers that question.

• Jet: [SAC: "Amazon responded to Jet’s launch by activating the combined might of its Marketplace and Retail businesses."]
• Marketplace: [SAC: "Amazon removed sellers’ offers from the Buy Box if shoppers could find the same products at lower prices on Jet.com."]
• Retail: [SAC: "Amazon deployed its first-party anti-discounting algorithm against Jet’s most popular products."]
• Result: [SAC: "Jet was acquired by Walmart only a year after it launched and ceased operations as an independent competitor."]
• Zulily: [SAC: "several suppliers stopped selling to Zulily altogether."]

These rivals did not "lose on price." Their discounts triggered penalties on Amazon against their own suppliers. A rival in that position loses its supply base, not a price contest. Meeting a price costs no competitor its suppliers. Amazon's two anti-discounting arms, working together, did.

The FTC-State Plaintiffs seek no duty to undercut. They ask the Court to condemn a coordinated response that turned each rival discount into lost shoppers and lost goods.

Amazon.com, Inc. challenges Plaintiffs' reliance on Jet and Zulily. The record does not connect the combined conduct to the outcomes Plaintiffs describe, and cumulation cannot convert lawful parts into an unlawful whole.

• The court left cumulation open. DKT-289 held that the court [DKT-289: "need not reach, at this point, the issue whether Defendants’ conduct should be considered cumulatively"]. That is a reservation, not a holding that combination supplies exclusion. If price matching is lawful alone and featuring is lawful alone, amplifying lawful conduct yields lawful conduct.
• Jet ended through a rival's decisions. The SAC pleads that Jet [SAC: "was acquired by Walmart only a year after it launched"] and that [SAC: "Walmart shut Jet down in 2020."] The record pleads no causal link between Amazon's conduct and either the sale or the shutdown. Jet's model depended on [SAC: "not collecting commissions from sellers"], and the record is silent on whether that model was viable independent of Amazon's conduct.
• Zulily was not excluded. The SAC pleads that Zulily [SAC: "abandoned its “Best Price Promise” initiative"] and removed Amazon price comparisons from its site. Dropping one promotion is not exit, and the record does not plead that Zulily left any market.
• Suppliers chose among channels. Per the SAC, suppliers left Zulily because they [SAC: "could not afford to lose their Amazon sales"]. That describes sellers weighing channels, not a supply base taken by Amazon.

Plaintiffs have not shown that the combined conduct excluded any rival. Amazon.com, Inc. concedes monopoly power in no market.

--- Drafting note: Two changes depart from the draft.

• The Zulily citation was shortened because the SAC text reads "price- comparison", with a line-break space. The draft's "price-comparison" would fail verbatim verification.
• The assertion that Plaintiffs' share figures place Walmart second was removed because the record does not clearly support it.

[PHASE CHECK] Turns 44-45 added new material: Plaintiffs used the Jet and Zulily episodes to argue cumulative effect. Amazon replied that cumulation was reserved, that no causal link to Jet's exit is pleaded, and that Zulily never exited. ASB/CXA contractual parity and Project Nessie liability remain unargued.

The FTC-State Plaintiffs challenge Amazon's claim that the record does not connect the combined conduct to its outcomes. The SAC pleads that connection expressly, and Amazon cannot treat it as silence.

• Jet. The SAC pleads causation: [SAC: "The combined force of Amazon’s anti-discounting schemes worked."] It pleads the result: [SAC: "Jet was forced to “revise[] [its] price leadership strategy to ‘simply match the lowest price elsewhere on the [w]eb instead of trying to beat it,’” and increased its prices."] Jet's later sale is beside the point. An entrant built to beat Amazon on price stopped trying and raised its prices.
• Zulily. The SAC pleads that [SAC: "Amazon observed a “consistent drop” in shopper visits to Zulily."] It further pleads that [SAC: "Zulily could not sustain its low-price campaign against a giant sitting on monopoly profits."]

Amazon's standard also misstates the test. Section 2 does not require a rival's exit. It reaches acts that [DKT-289: "tend[ ] to impair the opportunities of rivals"]. An entrant forced to abandon price leadership, and a rival that lost suppliers and traffic, are impaired opportunities.

The record also rebuts the "meeting competition" framing. Amazon did not ordinarily monitor Zulily. It aimed its surveillance at Zulily deliberately. With Zulily's traffic already falling, Amazon's Vice President of Pricing directed staff to [SAC: "keep going . . . [e]ven though their traffic is trending down"]. A firm meeting a competitor's price has no reason to keep pressing a retreating rival. A firm eliminating a price-cutter does.

Nor is each part lawful on its own. Stripping a supplier's Buy Box because a rival discounted is not price matching.

Amazon.com, Inc. challenges the premise of the Plaintiffs' first FBA mechanism. On the SAC's own pleading, compelled inventory-splitting is not established.

The multihoming theory rests on one proposition: [SAC: "sellers who do not want to sell solely through Amazon must split their physical inventory"]. The SAC then pleads an Amazon option that undercuts that necessity:

• An off-Amazon route exists within Amazon's network. [SAC: "To fulfill orders off Amazon, sellers can pay an additional fee for a separate Amazon fulfillment service."] The SAC does not allege that this service requires a second inventory or a second provider.
• The SAC's wording is qualified. FBA centers [SAC: "principally can be used to serve only Amazon customers."] "Principally" is not "exclusively."
• The remaining objection concerns features, not foreclosure. The SAC faults that service only because it [SAC: "does not provide custom packaging, standard integration with non-Amazon platforms, or visibility into the separate but complementary delivery process."] Those are product-quality comparisons. Section 2 imposes no duty on any firm to design its own service to match independent providers' features.

Several of the listed harms depend on compelled splitting that the pleaded service does not require: duplicative inventory, duplicative facilities, and inter-network transfers. What remains is a fee for an additional Amazon service. On the Plaintiffs' own framing, that is a question of fee level, not exclusion.

The record is silent on how many sellers used or declined that option, and why. The first mechanism of the tying theory therefore rests on an assertion that the SAC's own allegations qualify. Amazon.com, Inc. concedes monopoly power in no market.

[PHASE CHECK] Turn 48 raises a new argument: Amazon's separate off-Amazon fulfillment service undercuts the pleaded necessity of inventory-splitting. Plaintiffs have not answered it. Turn 47 added new record points on targeted surveillance of Zulily. Several liability sub-issues remain unjoined.

The FTC-State Plaintiffs challenge Amazon's claim that its separate off-Amazon service removes the need to split inventory. That service does not answer the tying theory. It is the toll the tie imposes.

• The tied product is walled off. [SAC: "Sellers cannot use FBA to fulfill orders off Amazon."] Reaching other channels through Amazon's network costs sellers [SAC: "an additional fee for a separate Amazon fulfillment service"]. A surcharge on multihoming confirms the pleaded theory that the tie [SAC: "raises the cost of multihoming"].
• The missing feature is the multihoming feature. The SAC pleads that the service lacks [SAC: "standard integration with non-Amazon platforms"]. An option that does not integrate with rival marketplaces does not make selling on them workable. That is a functional barrier, not a cosmetic gap.
• Amazon's leadership reportedly recognized the suppressed demand. A senior executive acknowledged that a [SAC: "seller doesn’t want to have two sets of supply-chain services, one that’s for Amazon and one that’s for someone else"].
• The second mechanism stands untouched. Amazon's argument does not address the harm that the tie [SAC: "forecloses independent fulfillment providers from competing to fulfill Prime orders on Amazon, depriving those independent providers of an important source of business and scale needed to build out an efficient fulfillment network."] A fee-bearing Amazon service for off-Amazon orders adds volume to Amazon, not to independent providers.

On this record, the off-Amazon option shows that multihoming sellers must route more business and more fees through Amazon. Conditioning Prime on FBA remains exclusionary monopoly maintenance.

Amazon.com, Inc. challenges the Plaintiffs' second mechanism. The SAC never quantifies the foreclosure it alleges, and it pleads that the rest of the fulfillment market remains open to independent providers.

A foreclosure theory must show that the conduct closes off a substantial share of the tied market. On that point the SAC describes rather than measures.

• No foreclosure share is pleaded. The SAC says only that [SAC: "Amazon, through FBA, is by far the largest U.S. supplier of online retail fulfillment services."] It states neither the size of the online retail fulfillment market nor the fraction that Prime-eligible Amazon orders represent. "Far smaller" and "by far the largest" are comparisons, not measures of foreclosure.
• The contestable volume is pleaded as open. The SAC pleads that [SAC: "Unlike Amazon’s FBA, independent fulfillment providers are agnostic about the channel from which sales originate."] Orders on rival marketplaces, rival superstores, and sellers' own websites remain available to them. The alleged restriction reaches Prime-eligible orders on one storefront, and the SAC itself says access is conditioned only [SAC: "generally"].
• Independent providers competed for Prime volume. The SAC pleads that [SAC: "UPS was advertising that its online retail fulfillment service could fulfill Prime-eligible orders."] A major carrier marketing that capability is not a firm denied the scale to enter.
• The claimed lost scale is counterfactual. Independent providers [SAC: "could have won significant business from Amazon’s third-party sellers."] That describes possible sales, not demonstrated exclusion.

Without a measured foreclosure share, the second mechanism rests on relative size alone. Amazon.com, Inc. concedes monopoly power in no market.

[PHASE CHECK] Turn 51 raised a new argument on the second FBA mechanism: no quantified foreclosure share, the UPS Prime-fulfillment advertising, and orders off Amazon remaining open to independent providers. Turn 50 also added new responses on the separate off-Amazon fulfillment service. Plaintiffs have not yet answered the foreclosure-share challenge.

The FTC-State Plaintiffs challenge Amazon's claim that the SAC never measures foreclosure. It does, and the pleaded figures are near-total.

• Amazon's share of the contested volume. [SAC: "In 2021, Amazon fulfilled nearly 92% of all orders made on Amazon across both its Marketplace and Retail business units."] Those orders run through the dominant marketplace, whose share [SAC: "grew to more than 71% by 2022."] The largest pool of online orders in the tied market is almost entirely closed to independent providers. That is a measured foreclosure share, not a comparison of relative size.
• The "open" channels are only the residual. Rival marketplaces and sellers' own sites hold the minority of marketplace sales left after Amazon's share is removed, and the anti-discounting conduct already argued shrinks them further. The pleaded result: [SAC: "These providers fulfill orders for only a few thousand, and often only a few hundred, sellers."]
• Scale is the mechanism of harm. [SAC: "Amazon recognizes that scale is necessary to build an efficient online retail fulfillment network."] Denying scale in the one pool able to supply it keeps rivals inefficient everywhere else.
• The UPS allegation confirms foreclosure. An independent provider competing for Prime volume was not allowed to stay in that competition. [SAC: "Amazon turned against SFP in early 2019, when it learned that independent fulfillment providers were advertising their ability to help sellers obtain Prime eligibility for products sold on Amazon and fulfilled through SFP."] Then [SAC: "Amazon formally decided to stop new enrollment in SFP."] Once entry appeared, Amazon closed the route.

The foreclosure is measured, substantial, and deliberately maintained. The FBA condition is exclusionary monopoly maintenance.

Amazon.com, Inc. challenges Plaintiffs' "measured foreclosure share." The 92% figure measures self-supply of Amazon's own inventory. It is not a share of the tied market.

• The figure includes first-party sales. The SAC pleads that Amazon fulfilled [SAC: "nearly 92% of all orders made on Amazon across both its Marketplace and Retail business units."] Retail is Amazon's own inventory, and that arm [SAC: "accounted for 40% of its overall unit sales in the second quarter of 2023"]. A retailer shipping goods it owns forecloses no one. No Prime policy ever made those orders available to independent providers. The two figures come from different periods, 2021 and 2023, which further undercuts any combined arithmetic.
• The tied market is defined by seller purchases. On the SAC's own definition, [SAC: "Sellers purchase online retail fulfillment services to complete online orders placed by shoppers."] Retail orders are not seller purchases. A foreclosure share must count only third-party orders routed to FBA because of the Prime condition. The SAC isolates no such figure. It also does not separate sellers who choose FBA on the merits from sellers compelled by the condition.
• The 71% figure is a marketplace share. It measures marketplace GMV, not fulfillment. The SAC never states the size of the online retail fulfillment services market.
• Off-Amazon channels are pleaded as open. The SAC describes independent providers as serving sellers across multiple marketplaces.

The record therefore contains no share of the tied market foreclosed by the Prime condition. Amazon.com, Inc. concedes monopoly power in no market.

[PHASE CHECK] Both of the last two turns added new material. Plaintiffs cited the 92% fulfillment figure, the 71% marketplace share and the UPS-to-SFP closure sequence to quantify foreclosure. Amazon replied that the 92% counts first-party Retail self-supply, citing the 40% Retail unit share and the SAC's seller-purchase definition of the tied market. Plaintiffs have not yet answered.

The FTC-State Plaintiffs challenge Amazon's assertion that the record contains no third-party foreclosure figure. Even after Amazon's own inventory is removed and same-year figures are used, foreclosure remains at a monopoly level.

• Third-party sales are the majority. [SAC: "Sellers’ products make up a growing majority of Amazon unit sales—60% in the second quarter of 2023, up from 55% in 2021."] The 2021 figure matches the year of the fulfillment figure, which disposes of Amazon's mismatched-period objection.
• The arithmetic isolates seller purchases. [SAC: "In 2021, Amazon fulfilled nearly 92% of all orders made on Amazon across both its Marketplace and Retail business units."] Assume, most favorably to Amazon, that Amazon fulfilled every first-party unit. Retail's 45% then accounts for at most 45 of the 92 points. That leaves at least 47 of the 55 third-party points, roughly 85% of seller volume. The SAC reports orders and unit shares on different bases, so the figure is approximate. The inference does not turn on precision, because even Amazon's own exclusion leaves near-total foreclosure.
• The record distinguishes compulsion from choice. When Prime without FBA was available, sellers sought it. [SAC: "An SFP waitlist maintained by Amazon quickly ballooned to more than 8,000 sellers just six weeks after Amazon stopped letting new sellers enroll."] That preference persists. [SAC: "Sellers continue to want Prime eligibility uncoupled from the coerced purchase of FBA services."] Demand for an alternative of this size is inconsistent with merits-based selection of FBA.
• The pleaded result follows. [SAC: "Conditioning Prime eligibility on FBA enrollment has locked in massive volumes of shipments exclusively to Amazon"].

The foreclosed share is measurable and substantial. The FBA condition is exclusionary monopoly maintenance.

Amazon.com, Inc. challenges the Plaintiffs' claim that the SFP waitlist separates compulsion from choice. Measured against the seller base the SAC pleads, the waitlist shows that only a small fraction of sellers sought the alternative.

• The waitlist is small. It reached [SAC: "more than 8,000 sellers just six weeks after Amazon stopped letting new sellers enroll."] The same pleading states that [SAC: "As of the first quarter of 2021, there were over 560,000 active sellers on Amazon’s U.S. Marketplace."] That is under two percent of the base, though the two figures date from different years.
• Peak enrollment is also small. [SAC: "At its peak, approximately 15,000 sellers had enrolled in SFP."] That is under three percent of the base.
• Demand of that size cannot establish compulsion across all FBA volume. The Plaintiffs treat FBA-fulfilled volume as foreclosed. Their own evidence of suppressed demand, however, covers only a small minority of sellers.
• The larger demand is asserted but not quantified. The SAC asserts that [SAC: "even these enrollment numbers understate seller demand for SFP"]. It supplies no figure. An unquantified assertion cannot convert an 8,000-seller waitlist into proof of market-wide foreclosure.
• The pleaded figures use mismatched bases. The fulfillment statistic counts [SAC: "orders made on Amazon"]. The third-party statistic counts [SAC: "Amazon unit sales"]. Subtracting one from the other yields no share of the tied market.

The record therefore contains no measured share of seller fulfillment purchases that the Prime condition compelled, as opposed to purchases sellers chose. Amazon.com, Inc. concedes monopoly power in no market.

SIMULATED FICTIONAL OUTPUT, not a prediction of any real ruling. The simulated bench finds for Plaintiffs on liability.

Standard. Conduct is exclusionary if it tends to "tend[ ] to impair the opportunities of rivals" without furthering competition on the merits [DKT-289]. Under the trial premise, the SAC is the record.

Anti-discounting. SC-FOD and ASB operate "regardless of the relative costs" [SAC]. ASB contractually requires prices elsewhere to be "as high or higher than their prices on Amazon at least 95% of the time" [SAC]. Amazon offers a truthful-price-signal justification, but its own memo says Buy Box disqualification "has not led Sellers to lower their prices" [SAC]. An executive also described the expansion as serving "the punitive aspect" [SAC]. Amazon's argument that fees, not the rule, keep prices high explains price levels on Amazon. It does not explain why rival sites cannot undercut Amazon.

First-party matching. Amazon's strongest point is that this algorithm, viewed alone, resembles meeting competition. The record does not present it alone. "The combined force of Amazon’s anti-discounting schemes worked" against Jet [SAC], and "Walmart ultimately discounted hundreds of thousands fewer products than it had initially planned" [SAC]. Amazon's argument that lawful parts sum to a lawful whole does not apply, because the seller-penalty component is not lawful on this record.

Prime tied to FBA. Sellers using independent providers "met Amazon’s stringent SFP standards more often than sellers fulfilling orders themselves" [SAC]. Amazon nonetheless excluded that path. The closure followed a meeting titled "3PL impact mitigation" [SAC]. Amazon made that decision knowing it would "slow overall shipping speeds for products sold on Amazon" [SAC]. The "speed and performance" rationale in DKT-289 is Amazon's own briefing, not a finding.

Foreclosure. Amazon correctly notes that the SAC mixes orders and units and gives no size for the fulfillment market. Even so, Amazon "fulfilled nearly 92% of all orders made on Amazon" [SAC], and the majority of those orders are third-party. Substantial foreclosure is therefore adequately shown, even though the figure is imprecise.

Justification. The SAC pleads that Amazon "could reasonably achieve any procompetitive goals through less restrictive alternatives" [SAC], and nothing in the record contradicts that allegation.

Conclusion. On this record, both courses of conduct are exclusionary monopoly maintenance.

The FTC-State Plaintiffs propose a remedy framework built on one pattern in the record: when Amazon abandons a restraint, it substitutes an equivalent one.

• Substitution. Amazon dropped the parity clause, yet [SAC: "Despite making this particular change, Amazon never abandoned its strategy of preventing sellers from offering lower prices elsewhere."] Amazon itself judged that the swap would appear [SAC: "not only trivial but a trick"]. On SFP, the announced reopening still shuts out independent providers: [SAC: "Amazon’s communications about upcoming changes to the SFP program continue to indicate that sellers would need to fulfill Prime orders themselves, without using independent fulfillment providers."] A decree that names only current mechanisms invites the next substitute.

The coalition therefore asks for a decree with three elements:

1. Anti-discounting. Bar any penalty triggered by a seller's lower price off Amazon. This covers Buy Box disqualification, search demotion, price suppression, and ASB or CXA sanctions. 2. Fulfillment. Decouple Prime eligibility from FBA. Open Prime on neutral performance standards to sellers using independent providers. 3. Anti-circumvention. Adopt the pleaded bar on [SAC: "similar or related conduct, or any conduct with the same or similar purpose and effect"].

Structural relief must remain available. The SAC seeks relief [SAC: "including but not limited to structural relief"], and [SAC: "Left unchecked, Amazon will continue its illegal course of conduct to maintain its monopoly power."] The form of structural relief belongs to the reserved remedies phase, in which [DKT-289: "the Court will schedule a conference to address how to proceed on remedies."]

Question for Amazon: given this record of repeated substitution, what conduct-only decree would stop the next equivalent restraint?

Amazon.com, Inc. answers the coalition's question. The SAC's own counterfactual identifies the restraints as the only barrier, so a decree that removes them, enforced through reporting, is complete relief.

• The SAC pleads that removing the restraints restores competition. [SAC: "In a market free from anticompetitive restraints, Amazon’s choice to exploit its monopoly power would create openings for rivals to enter, grow, and meaningfully compete."] On fulfillment: [SAC: "Without Amazon’s coercion, sellers could more easily offer their products to shoppers via multiple outlets, including other online superstores and marketplaces."] Amazon.com, Inc. disputes the premise of monopoly power and concedes none. Even on Plaintiffs' own theory, conduct relief produces the competitive world they describe. Structural relief is tied to no pleaded mechanism.
• Definitions, not breadth, address substitution. A decree can define the prohibited trigger as any sanction keyed to a seller's lower off-Amazon price. Any new mechanism using that trigger then falls within the decree. The pleaded clause reaching conduct with "the same or similar purpose and effect" gives no notice of what is barred.
• Price matching must remain permitted. The simulated bench found the first-party algorithm unlawful only in combination with seller penalties. Removing the penalties removes the combination. Barring matching risks what DKT-289's authority warned against: [DKT-289: "allowing such claims could, perversely, chill legitimate price cutting, which directly benefits consumers."]

Amazon.com, Inc. proposes three terms:

1. A bar on sanctions triggered by lower off-Amazon prices. 2. Prime eligibility on published, neutral performance standards, regardless of who fulfills the order. 3. Compliance reporting to the Court.

Nothing beyond these terms is tied to the adjudicated record.

The FTC-State Plaintiffs challenge Amazon's claim that a decree lifting the restraints is complete relief. Amazon's counterfactual describes a market that was never restrained. The market left after years of exclusion is a different one.

• The harm compounds and does not reverse when the restraints end. [SAC: "Amazon’s unlawful conduct has caused cumulative and compounding harm over time."] The result is pleaded: [SAC: "Through its years-long course of illegal conduct, Amazon has deeply entrenched its monopolies in both relevant markets and further widened the gulf between Amazon and everyone else."] Rivals do not regain denied scale when a prohibition takes effect. [SAC: "Particularly given the importance of scale economies and network effects in these markets, Amazon’s conduct has yielded a distorted and stunted competitive landscape."] Indeed, [SAC: "Independent fulfillment providers’ operations remain far smaller than FBA."] A purely forward-looking decree leaves that gap and the scale Amazon secured through the conduct.
• Amazon's second term restores the tie through the standard-setter. Under SFP, Amazon-authored standards acted as a gate. Sellers raised [SAC: "concerns that Amazon holds SFP sellers to stricter delivery benchmarks than FBA"]. The reopened program leaves the decision with Amazon, [SAC: "after which Amazon will determine whether they may participate in SFP"]. Standards Amazon writes and applies are not neutral and require independent oversight.
• The coalition's requested relief reaches the harm, not merely the conduct. The SAC seeks relief [SAC: "necessary to restore fair competition and remedy the harm to competition caused by Amazon’s violations of the law"] and aims to [SAC: "deny Amazon the fruits of its unlawful practices"]. Amazon's three terms accomplish neither. Structural relief remains properly before the Court for the reserved remedies proceeding.

Amazon.com, Inc. challenges the Plaintiffs' premise that only structural relief reaches the compounding harm. On the SAC's own account, the lost scale flows from the restraint, so lifting the restraint restores it.

• The SAC names one source of fulfillment scale. [SAC: "Independent fulfillment providers, too, benefit from large fulfillment volumes that can help them scale and reduce costs."] It identifies the blockage: [SAC: "Amazon ensures that independent fulfillment providers will stay artificially small by requiring that sellers who want Prime-eligible products use FBA for fulfillment."] It pleads the result of opening that volume: [SAC: "Had independent fulfillment providers been able to compete for Amazon order volumes, they could have won significant business from Amazon’s third-party sellers."] A decree opening Prime eligibility to independent fulfillment delivers those volumes directly. That remedies the "gap" the Plaintiffs cite.
• The anti-discounting harm works the same way. Once seller penalties are barred, the SAC pleads that [SAC: "rival online marketplaces could attract sellers by charging them lower fees, allowing sellers to pass those savings on to shoppers via lower prices."] Rival growth follows from that restored channel.
• The self-set-standards concern calls for review, not divestiture. Amazon.com, Inc. accepts that Prime performance criteria should be published, applied identically to every fulfiller, and subject to the Court's review. A conduct decree answers the SFP-gatekeeping objection.
• No structure is tied to the record. The SAC requests structural relief only generically. It pleads no divestiture and no business line whose removal cures any mechanism. DKT-289 reserved the form of relief: [DKT-289: "the Court will schedule a conference to address how to proceed on remedies."] Structure without a pleaded link to the conduct exceeds any remedy for what may be found.

[PHASE CHECK] Turn 61 raised compounding harm and Amazon's control of Prime standards. Turn 62 answered that restoring Prime volume and banning penalties rebuilds scale, and offered review of neutral standards. Plaintiffs have not yet named any specific structural remedy tied to a mechanism.

The FTC-State Plaintiffs challenge Amazon's claim that opening Prime eligibility delivers volume "directly" to independent fulfillment. On this record, Amazon controls the ranking and display systems that decide whether an open path carries any volume. It has already used those systems to empty one.

• SFP was open on paper and suppressed in the storefront. [SAC: "And despite Amazon’s promise that SFP products will receive the Prime badge, Amazon does not consistently display the Prime badge on SFP products."] Further: [SAC: "Amazon’s search filter that allows shoppers to view only Prime-eligible products suppresses Prime offers fulfilled through SFP."] The exclusion ran through display and filtering, not eligibility standards.
• Buy Box selection favors the tied product. The Featured Merchant Algorithm [SAC: "increases the odds that orders from sellers who use FBA will be featured"]. Under Amazon's proposed decree, sellers gain eligibility while FBA keeps the placement advantage. The promised volume would not follow.
• Amazon changes form under scrutiny rather than abandoning conduct. Regulatory pressure [SAC: "caused Amazon to superficially change or conceal many of its practices."] A reporting obligation that depends on Amazon's own disclosures does not answer that pattern.

The coalition therefore asks that any conduct decree include three further terms:

1. Fulfillment-neutral treatment in Buy Box selection, search ranking, badging and filters. 2. An independent monitor with access to those algorithms. 3. An express reservation of structural relief if neutrality fails.

Amazon's terms leave the storefront, where the tie operates, entirely under Amazon's control. That is the link to structural relief that Amazon says the record lacks.

Amazon.com, Inc. (Defendant) answers the coalition's display argument. The mechanism Plaintiffs identify is a set of ranking and badging rules. Rules are conduct, and a conduct term cures them.

• Plaintiffs' own evidence describes a display practice. The SAC pleads that [SAC: "Amazon does not consistently display the Prime badge on SFP products"] and that the search filter [SAC: "suppresses Prime offers fulfilled through SFP."] Both are correctable settings. A decree term requiring identical badging and filtering for every Prime-eligible offer, however fulfilled, reaches both directly.
• Neutral eligibility neutralizes the Buy Box preference. The Featured Merchant Algorithm gives [SAC: "preference to Prime-eligible offers"]. Once Prime eligibility turns on neutral performance standards, that preference attaches equally to independently fulfilled offers. One term barring separate weight for FBA as such closes the remaining gap.
• Structure does not reach the storefront. After any divestiture, the storefront's operator still controls its ranking and display systems. The SAC seeks relief [SAC: "including but not limited to structural relief"] only generically and pleads no separable business whose removal would change how offers are ranked. Plaintiffs' argument ties the harm to conduct rules, not structure.
• A standing reservation is unnecessary. DKT-289 already provides that [DKT-289: "If the Court renders a decision finding Amazon liable, the Court will schedule a conference to address how to proceed on remedies."] Ordinary contempt and modification powers answer any claimed noncompliance.

If liability is found, Amazon.com, Inc. accepts fulfillment-neutral terms for badging, filtering and Buy Box selection. It proposes Court-supervised compliance verification limited to those terms instead of an open-ended monitorship. Amazon.com, Inc. concedes monopoly power in no market.

[PHASE CHECK] Both of the last two turns added new material. Plaintiffs cited SFP badge and filter suppression and the Buy Box preference for FBA, and proposed a monitor and a structural reservation. Amazon answered by accepting fulfillment-neutral badging, filtering and Buy Box terms and offering limited court-supervised verification. The remaining disputes are narrowing but not fully joined.

The FTC-State Plaintiffs reject Amazon's claim that verification limited to named terms, backed by contempt, is enough. Contempt deters only violations that can be detected, and this record shows both evasion and destroyed records.

• Evasion under scrutiny. [SAC: "Amazon repeatedly paused Project Nessie when it grew concerned that the public might detect the higher prices Project Nessie produced."] Conduct that is switched off when watched will pass any verification Amazon can anticipate.
• Opacity by design. The seller-penalty system conceals its own trigger: [SAC: "Amazon does not, however, tell the seller where it found the lower price."] Violations of this kind will not surface in self-reported compliance.
• Destroyed records. [SAC: "Amazon executives systematically and intentionally deleted internal communications using the “disappearing message” feature of the Signal messaging app."] [SAC: "Amazon prejudicially destroyed more than two years’ worth of such communications—from June 2019 to at least early 2022— despite Plaintiffs’ instructing Amazon not to do so."] Verification that rests on Amazon's own records invites the same loss.

Amazon's fulfillment-neutral terms are necessary but not sufficient. The coalition asks that any conduct decree include:

1. An independent monitor with direct, continuing access to the Buy Box, search, badging, and price-surveillance systems, not Amazon-prepared summaries. 2. Mandatory preservation of business communications about the decree, with ephemeral messaging barred for covered subjects. 3. A standing reservation of structural relief, triggered by a monitor's finding of non-neutrality.

DKT-289 contemplates a remedies conference only after a finding of liability. It does not decide whether contempt alone can police conduct that Amazon keeps hidden.

Amazon.com, Inc. challenges the coalition's reliance on conduct outside the adjudicated remedy theory to justify algorithm-level monitorship and an automatic structural trigger.

• Project Nessie does not measure compliance risk for these terms. The simulated liability finding addressed anti-discounting and the Prime–FBA condition. Nessie is a separate count, pleaded as an [SAC: "unfair method of competition, called Project Nessie"], and as past conduct: [SAC: "From 2015 to 2019, Amazon deployed a secretive scheme"]. The SAC itself pleads that [SAC: "Project Nessie is currently paused"]. Conduct from a different count cannot supply the enforcement design for a decree governing Buy Box and fulfillment rules.
• Removing the penalty removes the opacity concern. The coalition cites the allegation that [SAC: "Amazon does not, however, tell the seller where it found the lower price."] That concealment matters only while a sanction keyed to lower off-Amazon prices exists. Amazon.com, Inc.'s first proposed term eliminates that sanction, which leaves no hidden trigger to detect.
• A monitor cannot decide structure. The coalition's third term would let a monitor's finding trigger structural relief. The Court has reserved remedies to itself: [DKT-289: "the Court will schedule a conference to address how to proceed on remedies."] Handing the choice of remedy to a monitor bypasses that process.

Amazon.com, Inc. offers one narrow accommodation. If liability is found, it does not oppose preserving business communications on subjects covered by the decree. Otherwise it maintains its proposal that verification be confined to the named neutrality terms, subject to Court review. Amazon.com, Inc. concedes monopoly power in no market.

[PHASE CHECK] Both final turns added new material. Plaintiffs cited the Signal deletions and sought preservation, a monitor with system access, and a structural trigger. Amazon distinguished Nessie as a separate count, argued that removing the penalty ends the opacity, conceded preservation, and objected to a monitor-triggered structure. The dispute over monitorship scope is still narrowing.

The FTC-State Plaintiffs dispute Amazon's claim that removing the price-keyed sanction removes the hidden trigger. Amazon's first term reaches only one of ASB's triggers. The others enforce the adjudicated FBA tie and would survive the decree.

• ASB contractually compels FBA. The SAC pleads that the [SAC: "Prime eligibility requirement compels ASB sellers to use Amazon’s fulfillment service for the vast majority of their products."] The penalty is expulsion from the Marketplace [SAC: "if they do not ensure that most of their products are Prime eligible"]. That trigger is keyed to Prime eligibility, not to off-Amazon price. A decree limited to price-triggered sanctions leaves it intact.
• Non-price terms reinforce the tie. [SAC: "the in-stock and Prime requirements exacerbate Amazon’s coercive fulfillment practices"]. Opening Prime to independent fulfillment achieves little if the sellers responsible for most Marketplace sales remain contractually bound to FBA.
• Relabeling is the documented risk. Amazon imposed restrictions [SAC: "under the guise of ASB policy enforcement"]. The sister program offers no exit, because CXA is [SAC: "neither “optional nor negotiable”"]. When one contract carries several triggers, a sanction barred under one label can return under another. Only direct access to enforcement records can tell the difference.

The coalition therefore asks for three terms in any conduct decree: 1. Void ASB's and CXA's Prime, selection and in-stock requirements along with their price terms. 2. Extend monitor access to ASB and CXA enforcement actions. 3. Return any monitor finding of non-neutrality to the Court, which decides structure itself. The coalition seeks no delegation of that decision.

Amazon.com, Inc. challenges the coalition's request to void ASB's selection and in-stock terms. Those terms are not the mechanism the liability finding rested on, and the Prime term stops compelling FBA once Prime is decoupled.

• The Prime term compels FBA only through the tie. The SAC pleads that the [SAC: "Prime eligibility requirement compels ASB sellers to use Amazon’s fulfillment service for the vast majority of their products."] That compulsion exists only because Prime currently requires FBA. Under Amazon.com, Inc.'s proposed term, Prime eligibility would rest on published, neutral performance standards regardless of fulfiller. An ASB seller could then satisfy the Prime requirement through an independent provider. Relief aimed at the tie removes this trigger, so no separate voiding is needed.
• Selection and in-stock terms were not the adjudicated conduct. The simulated liability finding cited ASB's price-parity term and the Prime–FBA condition. The in-stock term requires sellers [SAC: "to have nearly all of their inventory in-stock and ready for sale to Amazon customers"]. That is an availability standard, not a price floor or a fulfillment condition. The record pleads no rival excluded by in-stock rates alone. Voiding terms unconnected to the found mechanisms exceeds relief for the adjudicated conduct.
• A definition answers the relabeling concern. The decree can bar any ASB or CXA sanction triggered by a lower off-Amazon price or by a seller's choice of fulfiller.

If liability is found, Amazon.com, Inc. accepts voiding ASB and CXA price-parity terms and any term conditioning status on FBA use. It also accepts Court-reviewed verification of ASB and CXA enforcement actions limited to those two triggers. Amazon.com, Inc. concedes monopoly power in no market.

[PHASE CHECK] Turn 70 raised new record points: ASB's Prime-eligibility trigger, the in-stock and selection terms, and CXA. Turn 71 answered with new concessions, voiding ASB/CXA price-parity and FBA-conditioning terms and accepting verification limited to those triggers. The parties are narrowing the decree, but several disputes remain unresolved.

The FTC-State Plaintiffs challenge Amazon's position that ASB's selection and in-stock terms fall outside the adjudicated mechanisms. On the SAC's own terms, the selection term is triggered by off-Amazon conduct, and the in-stock term reinforces the fulfillment tie.

• The selection term penalizes differentiation off Amazon. Amazon threatens [SAC: "to boot them out of Amazon’s Marketplace altogether if they offer lower prices or a different selection of products on other online stores"]. Amazon's proposed definition covers price and the choice of fulfiller but omits selection. A seller offering exclusive goods on a rival site would still face expulsion.
• The pleaded harm is the same foreclosure of rivals. [SAC: "Rival online superstores or marketplaces are disincentivized from competing against Amazon by offering ASB sellers better terms in exchange for lower prices or exclusive selection."] Barring the price penalty while keeping the selection penalty leaves rivals unable to compete on either route.
• The in-stock term is part of the tie. [SAC: "the in-stock and Prime requirements exacerbate Amazon’s coercive fulfillment practices, discussed in Part VI.B, below, which raise sellers’ costs to sell on multiple online stores."] Decoupling Prime from FBA does not reach an obligation to hold inventory ready for Amazon customers.
• The SAC links these terms to the monopoly. [SAC: "These ASB conditions therefore substantially enhance Amazon’s monopoly power in both markets."]

The coalition therefore proposes extending Amazon's definition. Any decree should bar ASB and CXA sanctions triggered by:

1. A lower off-Amazon price. 2. The seller's choice of fulfiller. 3. The seller's selection or inventory allocation across other channels.

Court-reviewed verification should cover all three triggers.

Amazon.com, Inc. accepts part of the coalition's third trigger but opposes "inventory allocation." Once Prime is decoupled from FBA, the in-stock term forces no inventory splitting.

• Selection differentiation. The SAC pleads threatened expulsion if ASB sellers [SAC: "offer lower prices or a different selection of products on other online stores"]. If liability is found, Amazon.com, Inc. does not oppose a decree barring ASB and CXA sanctions triggered by a seller offering different or exclusive products on other online stores.
• The in-stock harm runs through FBA. The SAC pleads this directly: [SAC: "the in-stock and Prime requirements exacerbate Amazon’s coercive fulfillment practices, discussed in Part VI.B, below, which raise sellers’ costs to sell on multiple online stores."] It also supplies the cure: [SAC: "many sellers would prefer to commit all of their inventory to a single independent fulfillment provider of sufficient scale to facilitate sales across Amazon and non-Amazon sales channels."] Under the neutral-Prime term already proposed, one independent inventory pool can keep items in stock for Amazon customers while also serving rival channels. The splitting cost disappears. What remains is an availability standard toward Amazon's own shoppers, and the record pleads no rival excluded by that standard alone.
• "Inventory allocation" gives no notice. The phrase could reach any stock-availability expectation. It would reopen the notice problem that definitions exist to close.

Amazon.com, Inc. therefore proposes three triggers, each subject to court-reviewed verification: lower off-Amazon price, choice of fulfiller, and differentiated off-Amazon selection. Amazon.com, Inc. concedes monopoly power in no market.

[PHASE CHECK] The last two turns added new material. Plaintiffs tied the selection and in-stock terms to the found mechanisms. Amazon conceded a selection trigger and argued neutral Prime cures inventory splitting. Positions are narrowing, but core structural-versus-conduct points and monitor scope remain unresolved.

The FTC-State Plaintiffs challenge Amazon's three-trigger proposal. It reaches differentiated selection off Amazon but leaves untouched the affirmative mandate that operates on Amazon.

• The mandate works without any off-Amazon trigger. The SAC pleads a freestanding obligation: [SAC: "The selection requirement compels ASB sellers to sell most of their selection on Amazon"]. Amazon's accepted trigger bars sanctions for offering different goods elsewhere. It does not bar sanctions for failing to place most goods on Amazon. A seller that moves a product line to a rival site, rather than adding exclusives there, still breaches the mandate. That is precisely the product selection the pleaded theory says rivals are denied.
• CXA's purpose rebuts Amazon's claim that no rival was excluded. The SAC pleads that [SAC: "CXA, too, is motivated by Amazon’s fear of competition."] The feared rival is the seller itself, which might [SAC: "divert traffic away from Amazon, either by providing competing fulfillment capabilities and [P]rime like benefits through their own store, or by selling to a competitor with these capabilities."] Selection and in-stock mandates on the largest sellers keep those potential rivals committed to Amazon. The excluded competitor is the seller that never grows into one.
• Neutral Prime does not cure this. Decoupling Prime from FBA changes who fulfills the order. It leaves in place a contractual duty to route most selection to Amazon.

The coalition therefore asks that any conduct decree add one term:

• It would void the ASB and CXA requirements to list most selection on Amazon.
• It would limit the in-stock term to items the seller chooses to list on Amazon.
• It would extend court-reviewed verification to all four triggers.

Amazon.com, Inc. proposes resolving the ASB and CXA dispute on this footing: each mechanism argued in this phase is a severable contract term or storefront rule that a conduct decree can remove.

• ASB is a contract, and a decree can undo it. The SAC pleads that [SAC: "Amazon implemented ASB in September 2018 through an amendment to the Business Solutions Agreement."] It adds that [SAC: "The ASB restrictions are therefore binding contractual obligations that Amazon imposes on ASB sellers."] A decree voiding specified terms removes them as completely as the amendment created them.
• The selection mandate is one such term. The coalition identifies the obligation that [SAC: "The selection requirement compels ASB sellers to sell most of their selection on Amazon"]. If liability is found, Amazon.com, Inc. does not oppose voiding the ASB and CXA requirements to list most selection on Amazon. It also does not oppose limiting any in-stock term to items the seller chooses to list there. Court-reviewed verification would extend to all four triggers.
• Structural relief loses its predicate. The coalition relies on the pleading that [SAC: "These ASB conditions therefore substantially enhance Amazon’s monopoly power in both markets."] Amazon.com, Inc. concedes no such power. Even taking that pleading as true, the conditions are clauses. Divesting a business line does not void a clause. A decree does.

The proposed conduct decree therefore covers price parity, the fulfillment tie, fulfillment-neutral display, and the selection and in-stock mandates. No pleaded mechanism is left that only structural relief could reach. Any further relief remains reserved to the Court: [DKT-289: "If the Court renders a decision finding Amazon liable, the Court will schedule a conference to address how to proceed on remedies."]

[PHASE CHECK] Both final turns added material content. Turn 76 raised the on-Amazon selection mandate and CXA's purpose. Turn 77 conceded voiding those mandates and argued that clause-based harms leave no predicate for structure. Plaintiffs have not answered that argument. Monitorship scope, the ephemeral-messaging bar, anti-circumvention breadth, and a structural reservation remain disputed.

The FTC-State Plaintiffs challenge Amazon's premise that voiding a clause removes the restraint. Amazon has already dropped a price-parity clause, and the restraint continued.

First, the clause went but the policy stayed. The Business Solutions Agreement parity term ended in 2019. Afterward, an internal Amazon document [SAC: "acknowledged that Amazon intended to use SC-FOD to enforce its “expectations and policies,” which “ha[d] not changed.”"] The SAC pleads the result: [SAC: "Whether done contractually or algorithmically, Amazon requires sellers to keep prices off Amazon as high or higher than prices on Amazon."] Amazon argues that voiding specified terms removes them completely. That argument describes the very step Amazon itself took, and what followed was substitution, not competition.

Second, voiding clauses leaves the fruits in place. The tie built an asset, [SAC: "allowing it to scale its fulfillment network into the behemoth it is today."] Opening Prime eligibility going forward does not return that scale to independent providers. Their operations still [SAC: "remain far smaller than FBA."] The SAC asks the Court to [SAC: "deny Amazon the fruits of its unlawful practices"]. A decree confined to contract terms and storefront rules does not reach the fulfillment network the adjudicated tie produced.

The FTC-State Plaintiffs propose three terms:

• Amazon's concessions serve as the conduct floor.
• The reserved remedies conference expressly considers structural relief directed at the FBA fulfillment network.
• The decree includes the pleaded anti-circumvention clause. The 2019 substitution shows that clause-specific terms do not stop the same restraint by other means.

Amazon.com, Inc. challenges the coalition's request that the remedies conference consider structural relief directed at the FBA fulfillment network.

First, the network is not solely a product of the alleged tie. It also serves Amazon's own first-party inventory: [SAC: "In 2021, Amazon fulfilled nearly 92% of all orders made on Amazon across both its Marketplace and Retail business units."] The tying theory concerns conditioning third-party Prime eligibility, not Amazon shipping goods it owns. Network-directed relief would reach that untouched self-supply.

Second, the SAC itself pleads that fulfillment scale benefits shoppers: [SAC: "These speed and cost savings may be shared with shoppers via faster deliveries and cheaper products."] The coalition treated reduced fulfillment capacity as a harm, pleading that [SAC: "Amazon knew closing SFP would harm its shoppers by reducing the number of Prime-eligible offers available to Prime subscribers and slow overall shipping speeds for products sold on Amazon."] Dismantling efficient capacity would impose that same harm.

The 2019 substitution supports a functional conduct definition, not divestiture. The SAC describes the restraint as indifferent to form: [SAC: "Whether done contractually or algorithmically, Amazon requires sellers to keep prices off Amazon as high or higher than prices on Amazon."] Amazon.com, Inc.'s proposed triggers turn on what prompts a sanction, not on the instrument used. They cover any contract term, algorithm, or display rule keyed to a lower off-Amazon price, the seller's choice of fulfiller, or the seller's selection elsewhere. That definition reaches the cited substitution and gives notice that an open-ended "similar purpose" clause lacks.

Amazon.com, Inc. concedes monopoly power in no market.

[PHASE CHECK] Both final turns added new material. Plaintiffs named a specific structural target, the FBA network, and cited the post-2019 'policies had not changed' document and the 'behemoth' allegation. Amazon answered with new points: first-party self-supply, efficiency benefits to shoppers, and a functional-trigger definition. Neither side has yet replied to the other's new points.

The FTC-State Plaintiffs challenge Amazon's efficiency defense of the FBA network. The SAC pleads that fulfillment savings "may" reach shoppers. It then pleads that Amazon charged more instead.

• The savings were not passed on. Amazon relies on the allegation that [SAC: "These speed and cost savings may be shared with shoppers via faster deliveries and cheaper products."] That sentence states a possibility. The record pleads what actually happened: [SAC: "Amazon has increased the fulfillment fees it charges to sellers by approximately 30% in just two years, from 2020 to 2022."] The result is that [SAC: "Amazon now takes nearly one out of every two dollars of sales from sellers who use its fulfillment services"]. Scale whose gains Amazon captures through rising fees is not an efficiency that shields the asset from remedy.
• The SFP closure shows Amazon choosing exclusion over efficiency. Amazon points to slower shipping as a harm to avoid. The pleaded slowdown followed Amazon's own decision to close the independent-fulfillment path. Having chosen exclusion then, Amazon cannot now invoke efficiency to protect the asset that choice produced.
• Self-supply does not separate the network from the tie. The SAC attributes the network's growth to the tie: [SAC: "Conditioning Prime eligibility on FBA enrollment has locked in massive volumes of shipments exclusively to Amazon, allowing it to scale its fulfillment network into the behemoth it is today."] That the network also ships Amazon's own goods bears on how relief is tailored. It is not a reason to exclude relief from consideration.

The coalition's request is narrow. The reserved remedies conference should remain free to consider relief directed at the fulfillment network. The coalition does not seek structural relief now. Amazon's arguments go to tailoring, not to whether the question may be considered.

Amazon.com, Inc. challenges the coalition's use of the fulfillment-fee increase. On the SAC's own theory, that increase supports conduct relief, not relief directed at the network.

• A fee level is not an exclusionary act. DKT-289 recites the governing principle: [DKT-289: "The mere possession of monopoly power, and the concomitant charging of monopoly prices, is not only not unlawful"]. Amazon.com, Inc. concedes no monopoly power. Even on the coalition's premise, a remedy for exclusion targets the exclusion. It does not target the price level or the asset that charges it.
• The SAC pleads that open competition would discipline those fees. Opening Prime-eligible orders to independent fulfillment [SAC: "would enable them to gain scale and lower their costs to sellers."] A higher FBA fee widens the margin for independent providers to undercut it once that volume is contestable. The conduct terms Amazon.com, Inc. has accepted create exactly that opening. The fee increase therefore shows why decoupling works. It does not show why the network must be restructured.
• No designation is needed now. The coalition has stated that it does not seek structural relief at this stage. The existing order already leaves the form of relief open: [DKT-289: "the Court will schedule a conference to address how to proceed on remedies."] Pre-designating the fulfillment network would prejudge tailoring questions, including first-party self-supply, before any record on those questions exists.

Amazon.com, Inc. asks that any decree rest on the accepted conduct terms and functional triggers. Further relief should be governed solely by the conference DKT-289 provides, with no network-specific reservation. Amazon.com, Inc. concedes monopoly power in no market.

[PHASE CHECK] Turns 82–83 largely restate fee-level and efficiency points already made. The dispute has narrowed to whether network-directed structural relief should be expressly reserved. Both sides agree on a broad conduct floor. The remaining disagreements on anti-circumvention wording and monitorship are fully joined.

SIMULATED FICTIONAL OUTPUT. This is not a prediction of any real ruling. The simulated bench issues a behavioral decree.

1. Triggers. Amazon may not impose any sanction, whether by contract, algorithm or display rule, that is triggered by (a) a lower off-Amazon price, (b) a seller's choice of fulfiller, or (c) a seller's selection elsewhere. This functional definition answers the record of substitution: [SAC: "Whether done contractually or algorithmically, Amazon requires sellers to keep prices off Amazon as high or higher than prices on Amazon."]

2. ASB and CXA. The following terms are void: price-parity terms, FBA-conditioning terms, and the mandate that [SAC: "The selection requirement compels ASB sellers to sell most of their selection on Amazon"]. In-stock terms are limited to items the seller chooses to list on Amazon.

3. Prime neutrality. Prime eligibility shall rest on published standards that apply equally to every fulfiller. Buy Box selection, search ranking, badging and filters shall be fulfillment-neutral, given that [SAC: "Amazon’s search filter that allows shoppers to view only Prime-eligible products suppresses Prime offers fulfilled through SFP."]

4. Monitor and preservation. An independent monitor shall have direct access to the covered systems and to enforcement records. The monitor reports to the simulated bench and holds no remedial authority. Communications on covered subjects must be preserved, and ephemeral messaging on those subjects is barred. This term responds to the finding that [SAC: "Amazon executives systematically and intentionally deleted internal communications"]. Amazon has conceded that preservation is appropriate.

5. Structure. The simulated bench does not order structural relief. The record pleads only that fulfillment savings [SAC: "may be shared with shoppers via faster deliveries and cheaper products"]. It supplies no basis for tailoring relief around first-party self-supply. The simulated bench also designates no network-specific reservation. It does not foreclose structural relief either. Under DKT-289, [DKT-289: "the Court will schedule a conference to address how to proceed on remedies."] Monitor findings of non-neutrality may be presented there.

6. Price matching. Standalone price matching is not barred. Its unlawfulness rested on its combination with seller penalties, and the decree removes those penalties.