FTC et al. v. Amazon.com, Inc.

The simulated bench finds for Plaintiffs on this phase issue. This is a simulated fictional output, not a prediction of any real ruling.

Burden. Plaintiffs bear the burden. They "must prove that Amazon has monopoly power in a properly defined antitrust market" [DKT-289]. Under the trial premise, the SAC's allegations are the record unless the SAC, DKT-159 or DKT-289 contradicts them.

Online superstore market. The market rests on a distinct demand feature. Online superstores "compete to build long-term relationships with consumers across multiple purchases of a variety of items" [SAC].

Amazon's challenges are inferences, not contradictions:

• The SAC concedes that other stores "may price certain items comparably with online superstores" [SAC]. It also states that shoppers "do not seriously consider those stores as reasonable alternatives" [SAC].
• Physical stores serve as a benchmark in Amazon's documents. Being a benchmark does not make them substitutes.
• The grocery carve-out is supported by the finding that "Amazon generally sets regional prices for perishable grocery items" [SAC].
• The Walmart+ allegation is paired with the finding that rivals "have struggled to make serious inroads" [SAC].

The record contains no quantitative cross-elasticity evidence. The direct evidence fills that gap. Nessie "generated enormous profits for Amazon even though its higher prices caused Amazon’s unit sales to decrease" [SAC]. Amazon degraded quality while "not losing meaningful numbers of shoppers to rivals" [SAC]. The 20% follow-rate threshold does not show that rivals disciplined Amazon's prices.

Shares. Amazon's share is "well above 60%—and rising" [SAC]. On an admittedly overinclusive set, "Amazon still had a 60.8% share" [SAC]. No measure in the record falls below that level.

Marketplace services. "SaaS providers, unlike online marketplace service providers, do not provide access to an established U.S. customer base" [SAC]. Amazon's argument that fulfillment fees belong to a separate market has some force against the fee-increase evidence. However, power does not depend on those fees. Amazon holds "a market share of greater than 66% of marketplace sales" [SAC], measured by third-party data and protected by pleaded barriers.

The direct-to-consumer channel argument is not supported by the record. The SAC pleads that sellers keep Amazon and set their prices elsewhere to match it, rather than leaving Amazon for those channels.

Conclusion. Both markets are valid on this record, and Amazon holds monopoly power in each.

SIMULATED FICTIONAL OUTPUT, not a prediction of any real ruling. The simulated bench finds for Plaintiffs on liability.

Standard. Conduct is exclusionary if it tends to "tend[ ] to impair the opportunities of rivals" without furthering competition on the merits [DKT-289]. Under the trial premise, the SAC is the record.

Anti-discounting. SC-FOD and ASB operate "regardless of the relative costs" [SAC]. ASB contractually requires prices elsewhere to be "as high or higher than their prices on Amazon at least 95% of the time" [SAC]. Amazon offers a truthful-price-signal justification, but its own memo says Buy Box disqualification "has not led Sellers to lower their prices" [SAC]. An executive also described the expansion as serving "the punitive aspect" [SAC]. Amazon's argument that fees, not the rule, keep prices high explains price levels on Amazon. It does not explain why rival sites cannot undercut Amazon.

First-party matching. Amazon's strongest point is that this algorithm, viewed alone, resembles meeting competition. The record does not present it alone. "The combined force of Amazon’s anti-discounting schemes worked" against Jet [SAC], and "Walmart ultimately discounted hundreds of thousands fewer products than it had initially planned" [SAC]. Amazon's argument that lawful parts sum to a lawful whole does not apply, because the seller-penalty component is not lawful on this record.

Prime tied to FBA. Sellers using independent providers "met Amazon’s stringent SFP standards more often than sellers fulfilling orders themselves" [SAC]. Amazon nonetheless excluded that path. The closure followed a meeting titled "3PL impact mitigation" [SAC]. Amazon made that decision knowing it would "slow overall shipping speeds for products sold on Amazon" [SAC]. The "speed and performance" rationale in DKT-289 is Amazon's own briefing, not a finding.

Foreclosure. Amazon correctly notes that the SAC mixes orders and units and gives no size for the fulfillment market. Even so, Amazon "fulfilled nearly 92% of all orders made on Amazon" [SAC], and the majority of those orders are third-party. Substantial foreclosure is therefore adequately shown, even though the figure is imprecise.

Justification. The SAC pleads that Amazon "could reasonably achieve any procompetitive goals through less restrictive alternatives" [SAC], and nothing in the record contradicts that allegation.

Conclusion. On this record, both courses of conduct are exclusionary monopoly maintenance.

SIMULATED FICTIONAL OUTPUT. This is not a prediction of any real ruling. The simulated bench issues a behavioral decree.

1. Triggers. Amazon may not impose any sanction, whether by contract, algorithm or display rule, that is triggered by (a) a lower off-Amazon price, (b) a seller's choice of fulfiller, or (c) a seller's selection elsewhere. This functional definition answers the record of substitution: [SAC: "Whether done contractually or algorithmically, Amazon requires sellers to keep prices off Amazon as high or higher than prices on Amazon."]

2. ASB and CXA. The following terms are void: price-parity terms, FBA-conditioning terms, and the mandate that [SAC: "The selection requirement compels ASB sellers to sell most of their selection on Amazon"]. In-stock terms are limited to items the seller chooses to list on Amazon.

3. Prime neutrality. Prime eligibility shall rest on published standards that apply equally to every fulfiller. Buy Box selection, search ranking, badging and filters shall be fulfillment-neutral, given that [SAC: "Amazon’s search filter that allows shoppers to view only Prime-eligible products suppresses Prime offers fulfilled through SFP."]

4. Monitor and preservation. An independent monitor shall have direct access to the covered systems and to enforcement records. The monitor reports to the simulated bench and holds no remedial authority. Communications on covered subjects must be preserved, and ephemeral messaging on those subjects is barred. This term responds to the finding that [SAC: "Amazon executives systematically and intentionally deleted internal communications"]. Amazon has conceded that preservation is appropriate.

5. Structure. The simulated bench does not order structural relief. The record pleads only that fulfillment savings [SAC: "may be shared with shoppers via faster deliveries and cheaper products"]. It supplies no basis for tailoring relief around first-party self-supply. The simulated bench also designates no network-specific reservation. It does not foreclose structural relief either. Under DKT-289, [DKT-289: "the Court will schedule a conference to address how to proceed on remedies."] Monitor findings of non-neutrality may be presented there.

6. Price matching. Standalone price matching is not barred. Its unlawfulness rested on its combination with seller penalties, and the decree removes those penalties.